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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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14 February 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

GDR STATIONING OF SOVIET MISSILES DEFENDED

East Berlin TRIBUNE in German 18 Nov 83 p 11

[Holgar Arnhold interview with Maj Gen Prof Dr Horst Syrbe, commander, Social Sciences Department of the 'Friedrich Engels' Military Academy (date and place of interview not provided): "Adventurous Crusader Plans Which Were Already Thwarted Once; Unsuitable Concept of Imperialism to Eliminate Socialism; the 'Strategy of Total Confrontation'"]

Maj Gen Prof Dr Horst Syrbe was born on 25 November 1930 in Gera. Enameler by trade, he graduated from the social sciences academy under the SED Central Committee and held various posts in the NVA. He has for some time been the commander of the social sciences department of the 'Friedrich Engels' Military Academy in Dresden. For his distinctions he has been awarded the Patriotic Order of Merit in bronze, the combat medal, "For Distinguished Services for the People and the Fatherland," and the Friedrich Engels Award First Class.



[Text] [Question] Since the change in presidency in Washington in the early 1980's, U.S. imperialism has returned to a policy of containment and roll back of socialism reminiscent of the Cold War. What is the background of this greater aggressiveness of imperialist politics in international events?

[Answer] The detente tendencies of the 1970's never suited the ultramilitant agents of imperialism. The international power balance was tipping further toward progress; that much was apparent. Yet the external and internal positions of imperialism were disintegrating. Let me mention some facts: In the 1970's, production in the CEMA states grew three times as fast as in the capitalist industrial states. Through great efforts by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states, military-strategic parity had been obtained with the United States and NATO, a significant guarantee for peace. Socialism's steady peace strategy found worldwide response. It forced the imperialist representatives into signing important treaties and led to the successful process of the Helsinki Conference in 1975. The liquidation of the imperialist colonial system was in fact consummated.

Sinking growth rates (they invented the concept of "zero growth"), rising inflation, unprecedented unemployment figures and other manifestations of crisis within imperialism were accompanied by sensitive losses in previous positions of predominance. Defeat in Vietnam shook the top imperialist power. Terms like "Vietnam shock" or "Vietnam syndrom" reflect the profound effect it had in the United States. Further losses of U.S. positions occurred in Laos, Afghanistan, Iran, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua and elsewhere. The design to use detente to weaken socialism and strengthen their own system did not compute either.

All that conjured up greater efforts by the most aggressive imperialist circles toward halting and reversing the course of events and proceeding from detente to sharper tension, conflicts, a forcible policy of strength, extortion and aggression.

[Question] To that end, the Reagan administration prepared a complex, militant, anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary program U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger has called a "strategy of total confrontation" between the United States and the USSR. What is that aimed at?

[Answer] A concentrated expression of the principally military-strategic considerations is found in the U.S. Defense Department "defense guidelines for the 1984-1988 budgets." At a U.S. State Department conference in October 1982, appropriate "accompanying" measures were decided on, under the deceptive title, democratization of communist countries, unmistakably aimed at counterrevolution and unabashed intervention (see Chile, Grenada, Nicaragua, or the kindling of the counterrevolution in Poland). NATO organs conferred on the consequences for coordinated action and set down measures.

What becomes unmistakably clear is that this amounts to a complex preparation and combined employment of all military and non-military potentials of the United States and its allies aiming at a roll back and, eventually, the elimination of socialism.

[Question] What are the chief components of this devilish strategy threatening mankind?

[Answer] That can be summarized as follows:

--Regaining military-strategic superiority to be able to conduct one or several wars (simultaneously in various regions) and win. That includes nuclear as well as conventional wars. Particular importance is attached to a superior nuclear first strike capacity.

--A stronger and more coordinated fight against socialism and its world-outlook through ideological and psychological warfare.

--Forceful economic-technological warfare and arms race to weaken socialism economically and socially.

--Buildup and employment of U.S. special subversive operations teams.

By means of a gigantic power and propaganda apparatus, the Reagan administration seeks to inject the American people with a missionary spirit garnished with liberty and democracy phraseology and shut up the "other America" in the process. Reagan himself has repeatedly called for a "crusade by the western world against communism," as he did before the British parliament on 8 June 1982. In an arrogant manner he had the presumption to raise the demand to "dump Marxism-Leninism onto the ash heap of history." For that, NATO should have to be strengthened.

[Question] Didn't we hear such words once before?

[Answer] We do know them, and their results always hit at their originators. Another U.S. president it was who brutally proclaimed that Vietnam should be "bombed back to the stone age." That should be recalled. But first of all let us remember the anticommunist crusade German fascism instigated. Hitler declared the supreme and most urgent job of his government was to eradicate communism.

At dawn on 1 May 1945, the 1,400th day of the war, the Soviet information bureau announced the Red Army had taken the Reichstag in Berlin. As in other western cities at the time, New York also held a thanksgiving service.

Reagan and the proponents of his perilous and militaristic course ought to take stock thoroughly once again of the lessons of those events.

[Question] Aggressive U.S. policy is expressed in a hectic, dangerous and unprecedented arms buildup. Can you describe this leap into the arms buildup by some examples of your own?

[Answer] Immense it is indeed by what dimensions the most aggressive imperialist circles seek to escalate the arms buildup. In 1948, roughly at the time that the Cold War began, U.S. arms expenditures came to \$ 12 billion, in 1976, they had crossed the 100 billion mark, and last year, the 200 billion. By 1988, the arms budget is to have climbed to, literally, \$ 424.3 billion. For the next year alone, they intend a nominal growth of 14 percent. If one compares the 1948 expenditures only with the MX program (the new ICBM's), that alone shows a doubling. The MX program is priced at \$ 26.4 billion.

The FRG's 1983 budget shows a plus of 6.1 percent for "armaments expenditures" over the year before. For labor and social benefits, it shows a minus of 1.6, and for youth, family and health, even a 7.5 percent minus.

NATO's 1978 long-term armaments program has set down circa 1,300 positions up to 1993.

This arms buildup intensifies the situation extraordinarily because it is supposed to create the prerequisites in arms technology to achieve the already summarized confrontation and war strategy. It mainly means colossal business for the arms monopolies which will make twice or three times as much profit as is made in capitalist production on the average.

[Question] Is it not pure cynicism in this context for Reagan to call the MX program a "peacemaker"?

[Answer] The voice of the other America, the one that loves peace, clearly and cogently called the MX a "peace killer." Cynicism, demagoguery and anticommunist agitation are as much part of the imperialist arsenal as its unleashing always again new malignant campaigns and whipping up nationalistic sentiments.

Reagan's true position came out unalloyed, e.g., at his 27 May 1981 graduation speech at the West Point military academy. There the president praised the "new spirit" that had been revived in the United States. The "era of scruples" had passed. -- What an admission.

[Question] Could you still say something about the ways and means of the U.S. and NATO leadership that are supposed to provide the desired success for the war strategy you summarized?

[Answer] First one must mention the much enforced course recently toward a disabling first nuclear strike against the USSR and the other socialist states. In extending the U.S. President's directive 59 of 1980, the demand is made to defeat the Soviet Union--as they put it--"on every conflict level--from insurrections to nuclear war." The so-called disabling strike is the center of it. Political and military command centers, arms and troop concentrations, and industrial and transportation centers are meant to be destroyed in a concentrated manner. New weapons systems like the MX, the new strategic bomber B-1, new Trident class submarines, and laser weapons aboard space ships serve this policy as much as the production and deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe.

[Question] The latter have indeed played a central role for some time in the struggle against the threat of nuclear war. The Geneva negotiations have thus far produced no constructive results because of the destructive U.S. posture.

[Answer] Indeed, the intended deployment of 572 U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe (of which all 108 Pershing II and 96 cruise missiles are to go to the territory of the FRG) has stirred up millions of people. Their few minutes of flying time--which practically permits no prealert--deep down into Soviet territory and their great explosive force and target accuracy are of strategic weight.

In Geneva and elsewhere, the Soviet Union has kept making constructive proposals up to very recently, suggested bold solutions, assumed far-reaching obligations itself--such as renouncing the first use of nuclear arms, a unilateral moratorium on the SS-20 production, and so forth. Unfortunately, the other side responded to all that only by calumnies, pseudo-propositions, distortions and provocations. How could the Soviet Union accept such an illogical notion as keeping the arsenals of England and France out of account? British and French medium-range nuclear weapons, after all, have the total strength of some 12,000 Hiroshima bombs.

Reagan's "zero solution" proposition was meant for "political zeros," but those his deputies are negotiating with are not that.

[Question] Those adventurers in the Pentagon and at NATO headquarters, are they staking everything on the "nuclear card"?

[Answer] No. Their "total confrontation" strategy contains as the most dangerous element the preparing of the armed forces at diverse scope and diverse intensities. One of the variants is preparing for a protracted conventional war, i.e., without nuclear weapons though while constantly threatening their first use, with Central Europe considered the main theater of war. That is the primary purpose NATO pursues with its "long-term armaments program."

In 1982, there were first published the ideas of the U.S. military leadership about the feasibility of conventional war against the USSR and its allies coined, among others, by the NATO supreme commander for Europe, General Rogers (the Rogers Plan).

Under the term "aid-land battle 2000," this conception, extending down to the year 2000, anticipates sudden and combined NATO land and air strikes into the depth of the USSR against the forward strategic echelon of the Warsaw Pact armed forces while destroying their second echelon to prevent a counter-offensive. This conception, essentially, as PRAVDA said on 2 December 1982, is none but a modernization of the "Blitzkrieg" doctrine. It is based on the increased effect of conventional technical weapons.

Based on the Rogers Plan, the NATO armies, up to the end of the 1980's, are to get new conventional precision weapons and most up-to-date means of radio-electronic combat. The five U.S. divisions in Central Europe are to be shifted closer to the Warsaw Pact borders and to be increased to ten division in case of crisis or war. In the next 5 years, the U.S. combat troops stationed in Europe are to get more than 400 new weapons and logistics systems for roughly \$ 50 billion. Ammunition and supplies supposedly are already there for more than 30 days.

[Question] What is the reaction from the Soviet Union and the other socialist states to that?

[Answer] At the celebrations of the 66th anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution, Grigoriy Romanov expressed the firm resolve of the CPSU and the Soviet state to carry on resolutely the clear foreign policy course for peace, against aggressive intentions, and of solidarity. In full agreement, this has also been confirmed by our party leadership and government for the GDR. Their readiness for dialogue on behalf of peace was emphatically reiterated.

To grant the war forces no chance, however, no military superiority of imperialism may be permitted. That is why our peace policy also implies a strong socialist national defense. And that precisely is the reason why, in accordance with agreements made, preparatory efforts are under way for stationing missile complexes, operational and tactical in purpose, on GDR and CSSR territory. Let us jointly do what we can for peace to be preserved and socialism, through each citizen's personal dedication, to become stronger and be reliably protected, so as to thwart the anti-humane designs of imperialism.

HUNGARIAN ARTICLE EXAMINES ROLE OF POLISH PRESS, MEDIA IN 1980-1983

Budapest JEL KEP in Hungarian, No 4, 1983 pp 141-148

[Article by Andras Domany: "After the Period of the 'Propaganda of Success'"]

[Text] "An important element of the political crisis in our country was the loss of credibility by the press, radio and television, because the flow of information was restricted and the mass media were controlled by administrative measures The task of the press, radio and television is to provide the prerequisites for the functioning of socialist democracy, to realize the constitutional principle of freedom of speech, the openness of public life, society's control of the organs of state power, to encourage the citizens' participation in public life All mass media must serve to strengthen the socialist system." (From the resolution of the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress.)

In the summer of 1983, when martial law was lifted while I was substituting for the Hungarian Radio's Warsaw correspondent, the second anniversary of the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress was widely commemorated in Poland. But this is not the only reason why it is worthwhile and necessary to go back to the documents of July 1981 when speaking of the press and the other media. The main reason is that even today--despite the stormy and difficult times since then, and the 18 months of martial law--the extraordinary congress sets the guiding principle, not only as a slogan but in actual fact.

'Ignominious Role'

From the very outbreak of the crisis, the press and information were at the center of attention. Not only because life in Lublin had become practically paralyzed before the provincial paper mentioned anything about the strike, and additional weeks went by before the central papers also wrote about it. The story goes back much farther. After the results of the 1970's, as the state of the economy worsened and the leadership increasingly lost contact with reality and the masses, and therefore was less and less willing to take cognizance of reality, the press turned commensurately drab. Or what was even worse, what the press was reporting became less and less true.

The special committee established under Tadeusz Grabski to investigate the responsibility of the party leadership's members submitted to the congress a

report that spoke of the "ignominious role" of the so-called propaganda of success and placed the blame for it on Edward Gierek, Jan Szydlak and Jerzy Lukaszewicz. (Lukaszewicz, the relatively young, very forceful and self-assured agitprop secretary of the Central Committee, was among the first to lose his job, already in August 1980. For months thereafter, he defended himself very bitterly, but the congress expelled him from the party. When martial law was introduced, he was placed in a concentration camp. He died in July 1983, at the age of 51.) The report characterized the "propaganda of success" as follows:

"This method meant that the social contradictions, growing difficulties, and mistakes were concealed. At the same time a negative feature of this propaganda was that it did not appreciate all the achievements of people's Poland to date and placed the results mostly in the 1970's The actual situation of the party and of the state was kept secret, whereby the 8th congress (in February of 1980) was prevented from presenting a suitable assessment and from adopting an appropriate resolution."

At the time of the congress, the party was forced to formulate its new concept of the press in a very difficult situation. Public interest and the thirst for information increased immensely, but so did the critical attitude of the readers, listeners and viewers. The weekly SOLIDARNOSC appeared and assumed an increasingly oppositionary role. (It was subject to censorship, but in the given tense situation the censors were unable to meaningfully change the paper's tone.) At the same time it must be admitted that it was an interesting and well-edited paper that discussed many real problems with harsh frankness. But this--and the general situation--led to where the view gained wide acceptance among the staff members of the party press (or more widely: of the press that unanimously supported the government), and also among the radio and television staff, that they had to anticipate the inimical criticism, lead the ruthlessly frank uncovering of mistakes and the renewal of the press, and avoid relinquishing the field to the enemy.

This wave produced also excesses and mistakes. As a counterreaction to them, there emerged standpoints--mainly at certain organs of the party press and at TV News--that wanted to curb also the necessary deep-digging and critical analysis, after admitting in a single sentence the mistakes of the former leadership, with emphasis on the continuity and successes of building socialism. (In other words, the division that existed within society and among party members now appeared in the press as well.) A delegate, the journalist Jerzy Majka (then first secretary of the party committee at RSW Prasa, the publishing house for the party press; now chief of the PZPR Central Committee's Information Department), had this to say at the congress:

". . . how often even the various antisocialist attacks and provocations encounter no party-minded response and polemics in our columns! One starting point of such opportunistic behavior is when the media are presented to be impartial relayers of information. standing above the social classes and political parties The word 'concrete' (a synonym for 'stubborn') was coined at the congress of the Union of Polish Journalists. It is being used to denote those who refuse to face the truth and think, but also those who dare defend the principles of our ideology and the self-identity of our party. When it

comes to defending principles, I do not mind being called 'concrete'. Let them call me 'granite' instead, for that is even harder. I would rather be 'concrete' than 'dough' . . ."

According to the congress report presented by Stanislaw Kania, the "propaganda of success" led to where "contrite and repentant behavior became particularly pronounced among journalists after the August breakthrough, with ideological wavering and uncertainty The instrumental and directive methods that the party previously employed in managing the press, radio and television proved ineffective. Attempts to elaborate new instruments for exerting influence did not produce the desired results. Consequently, also antiparty and antisocialist statements appeared on the pages of our press and in the radio and television programs."

(So far as "repentance" is concerned, reporter Jacek Snopkiewicz, a delegate of the Radio and Television party committee, had this to say in context with the propaganda of success: "It is true that the propaganda of success had the support of thousands of pens, microphones and cameras that jumped at its beck and call. But it is likewise true that many journalists paid dearly for opposing the increasingly negative phenomena, the distortion of socialist principles, and the mandatory stereotyped forms of propaganda Today our party must rely on these journalists.")

The mistrust of the party and the sometimes astoundingly uncritical attitude toward Solidarity had also their easily explainable psychological reasons. But it should also be noted that Solidarity--which prided itself as an example and only guaranty of democracy--was no longer the mass organization of the initially spontaneous industrial actions, but a very strongly centralized and autocratic organization that was incapable of self-criticism. Thus in its own press--and even outside its own press, from the by no means few journalists who attached themselves to it--Solidarity demanded unconditional service. And thus while the party press sharply criticized and analyzed the party's activity (often justifiably, but mistakes by the party press also were not uncommon), Solidarity was absolute perfection according to its own press, and it routinely labeled as "biased attack against the trade union" any criticism from the outside.

All this did not prevent a major proportion of public opinion from believing Solidarity and its press, while the "official" news media met with mistrust and even hatred. "The press is lying," "TV is lying." Let us admit that the crowds repeated these slogans enthusiastically and with conviction, even if the cheerleaders themselves unquestionably were organized. Especially TV News was often criticized. My personal opinion is that this criticism was not entirely unfounded: the coverage of important events often was meaningless, leaving out the very essence. Of course, this atmosphere was purposefully incited by enemy forces who did not want to see any growth of confidence in the "official" press because they knew this also meant confidence in the party. Yet I am convinced that in the summer of 1981, looking at things objectively, there still was (or could have been) reason for the restoration of confidence in the party: the congress adopted a prudent and convincing program. This rejection of the official media and the failure of the majority of the people, including party members, to even read the congress documents played a decisive role in that this

program never reached most people and remained practically unknown, enabling Solidarity to claim even months later as its own many ideas and demands with which the people sympathized and which had been included clearly in the resolution of the party congress.

Special mention should be made of the role that the Association of Polish Journalists attempted to play. After their congress in the autumn of 1980, criticism of the preceding period "broke loose," while most of the union's new officers supported Solidarity, uncritically and unconditionally. Parallel with this, however, they also wanted to assume a sort of political mediating role between the party and state leadership on the one hand, and Solidarity and even the church and other forces on the other. Stefan Bratkowski, the union's chairman --a renowned and good journalist who had been banned for years during the Gierek era--attacked the delegates to the party congress, publicly and in a vulgar manner, although he himself was a party member. After repeated warnings, he was expelled from the party for a variety of erroneous views. (However, another case is typical of how complicated the situation was at that time: The weekly RZECZYWISTOSC, with which also Tadeusz Grabski was affiliated after his removal from the leadership, published a letter from a reader who simply branded as a CIA agent Professor Hieronim Kubiak, a member of the PZPR Politburo who at that time was also a secretary of the Central Committee. The editor in chief of this paper was summoned before the Central Control Committee for a warning discussion, which is not regarded as disciplinary action. Somebody brought up this double standard at a session of the Central Committee.) Because the officers of the Association of Polish Journalists persisted in their standpoint even after the imposition of martial law, the organization was disbanded in the spring of 1982. In its place a new organization was formed, the Association of Polish Journalists of the Polish People's Republic, which was received with reservation by a fairly significant proportion of the profession. By the time of its first congress held in June of 1983, however, about two-thirds of the journalists were members of the union.

Under Martial Law

The imposition of martial law meant a new period also in the press. Most papers ceased publication for varying lengths of time, and every journalist had to undergo screening. Naturally, this sparked much debate and resentment, although it was obvious that something had to be done. Quite a few people left the editorial offices voluntarily, either to avoid being fired, or because they refused to accept martial law and to "collaborate with the regime," as some of them called this. At the 10th plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in October 1982, however, Zbigniew Kamecki, an economics professor and a member of the Central Committee, declared that in the screening of journalist--despite General Jaruzelski's repeated assurances--"many of the personnel decisions were against the law." One cause of this, he claimed, was that "within our party we have not distanced ourselves from those who regard the imposition of martial law as a victory, whereas actually . . . it was only an administrative victory and at the same time a political defeat." It is true that this statement provoked sharp debate, in the course of which Politburo member Stefan Olszowski, who until the summer of 1982 was the Central Committee secretary responsible for propaganda, said: "The statement that the screening of journalists was of a vindictive nature is a vulgar accusation."

In the end the following changes occurred in the press after the imposition of martial law:

About a tenth of the journalists were not cleared. Naturally, the screenings produced the most change at the biggest publishing house for newspapers, RSW Prasa that was under direct party control. There 123 journalists were advised to seek other work, 173 had to transfer to "politically less exposed publishing houses," and 202 were reassigned within RSW Prasa to other, obviously less important, editorial offices. Seventy-five editors in chief, 95 deputy editors in chief, and 88 secretaries of editorial offices were relieved of their duties.

At Radio and Television headquarters 75 journalist staff members were dismissed, and 122 from the 16 regional studios. (The 1983 staff reduction affecting about 400 employees was attributed not to political reasons, but to the rationalization and economization efforts of Radio and Television's new president, Wojciechowski.) There were personnel changes in 36 key posts at Radio and Television. Twelve persons within the Democratic Party's press were not cleared; six within the United Peasant Party's press; 26 at the papers of Catholic PAX Association; and 12 within the press of the counterpart of Hungary's MTESZ [Federation of Technical and Natural Science Associations].

All these data are from the journal of the new association of journalists, PRASA POLSKA (No 1, 1983). The same issue also noted that not every decision was final: of the 106 colleagues who had turned to it for assistance, the association's committee for safeguarding the members' interests was able to have 52 rehired, mostly on the condition that the association would guarantee their conduct.

I should immediately add that the screening affected only the retention of staff positions. No one was banned from publishing or appearing (as I will explain further on, there is no legal basis to do so). Most of the people removed from the editorial offices are writing even now. And I know of a TV colleague who had to leave television but is still hosting a live show, as a freelancer. (Several interesting job changes are mentioned in the review of the book "Nem csak sajtótörténet" [Not Only Press History] in this same issue.) This process witnessed also some surprising changes of direction: several atheists and former party members--Bratkowski, for example--began to publish in the Catholic press, and not even in its "friendly" part. This does not attest to very strong ideological principles, not even if it might be argued that an opportunity to publish is being offered there, and one has to live somehow after all.

In any event, by the summer of 1982 the press was more or less stabilized organizationally and in terms of personnel. And although a few papers have ceased publication and a few significant journalists are not writing, or not in the important papers, the Polish press continues to be varied and interesting.

Individuality of Papers

What is the Polish press really like? First of all, there is an abundance of papers. Many sociopolitical weeklies are published even in the provinces, in addition to the provincial papers and journals. It is typical that the various papers review one another, calling attention to one another's more interesting writings. I was surprised at first to find that journalists often are interviewed, in papers of different persuasion than their own. This of course happens only to journalists with established reputations, and my impression is that many interesting and important personalities are working in the Polish press. People who hold original and independent views and have a world outlook of their own. This leaves a strong imprint also on the individual papers.

On the whole it can be said that the individual organs of the press, or at least most of them, typically follow a distinct line. To put it differently, we might say that it is easy to recognize to whom each paper belongs. And here I have in mind not only that the Catholic press is considerable, more about which later, but also that even the papers published under the auspices of the party differ considerably. The already mentioned RZECZYWISTOSC or even more to the "left" the monthly BARWY cannot possibly be confused with POLITYKA or with ZDANIE, the journal of the Marxist intellectuals in Krakow, although they all profess the policies of the PZPR. In addition, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party have their own press. For example, KURIER POLSKI, the Democratic Party's afternoon paper, is very entertaining, a moderately bourgeois sensation-seeking paper.

It will be worth while to present some data also on the Catholic press, noting that behind the Catholics as a whole there are very many different political directions. First of all there are three Catholic lay organizations, represented also in the Sejm. PAX, the organization that unambiguously supports socialism and is always loyal to the party leadership, has a daily (150,000 copies) and three weeklies (with a combined run of 290,000 copies). The similar but ecumenical Christian Social Association has three weeklies (110,000 copies jointly). The Polish Catholic Social Union plays the role of the "loyal opposition in parliament" and, unlike the first two organizations, maintains good relations with the clergy. This organization publishes a weekly (30,000 copies) and a journal (5,000 copies).

In addition, there are four weeklies (with 475,000 copies among them) and two biweeklies (63,000 copies) that are directly called "Catholic weeklies." The most important among them is TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, published in Krakow. Its editor in chief since 1945 is Jerzy Turowicz, a close friend of Pope John Paul II. It represents the extreme of today's legally existing press in Poland, remains at the edge of legality (although with many deletions by the censors), and pursues a basically hostile, withdrawn and esoteric policy. It is indisputably controversial. In addition to all this there are 10 monthly journals (with a combined total run of 422,000 copies), for example, the journal of the Jesuits, that of the Franciscans, etc. It is meaningless to add up these figures, specifically because of the essential political differences. But they nevertheless give some indication of the relative weight of the Catholic press that is independent of the party and of management by the state.

In spite of all this it is by no means rare that the personality of an editor in chief makes a paper, and it is obviously a result of individual and characteristic policy that polemics between papers are very frequent. Occasionally they are very entertaining, but at the same time they are very sharp in tone and often offensively personal. (In recent years there were also several lawsuits for defamation of character among publicists.) These features, of course, are undesirable, but the differences between journalists in terms of their political standpoints, personality, outlook and life-style are reflected very clearly also in their debates. (Everyone follows the debates mostly in his own paper, and since these are usually weeklies, this lends a certain rhythm to the "clashing of swords.") Thus the readers feel that the better publicists are practically personal acquaintances.

It is interesting how often the other papers become annoyed with POLITYKA, and especially with its sharp-tongued columnist, Daniel Passent. An entire series of papers, from RZECZYWISTOSC to PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY, are constantly pecking at them for some writing or other. And Passent and his colleagues, of course, repay in kind. I find it difficult to illustrate the subjects of controversy because too many specific explanations would be required to understand them.

A special type of polemic is the one that can be waged with the government's spokesman, although it is less likely to appear in domestic publications. The government's spokesman holds press conferences regularly (usually every week) at which any question may be asked. Often other cabinet members or government experts also are present. I am more familiar with the press conferences for foreign correspondents (the press conferences for domestic journalists are held separately), and at those truly everything is discussed. Occasionally rude and malicious questions or statements also can be heard, and sometimes the Western correspondents are outright sarcastic, and yet these press conferences are very important channels of information. Urban manages them superbly: even the way he evades questions tells you much; but when he does answer, his arguments are witty and lucid. Admittedly, what he says is often distorted or disbelieved --and for this reason he has repeatedly questioned the sense of holding press conferences--but in my opinion this method is very good and useful. The domestic papers cover also the press conferences held for foreign correspondents, and in this indirect manner (in conjunction with the questions and the answers to them) they bring up also topics about which they otherwise do not write.

Censorship Law, Press Law

An integral part of the process of socialist renewal that began in 1980 is a very intensive legislative program that is intended to elaborate political and economic reforms, and a system of institutional guaranties to prevent the occurrence of new distortions. This applies also to the press, and at this writing only the draft of the Press Law is available. Legislative work actually began earlier, in the summer of 1981, with the enactment of the Censorship Law (officially known as the Law on Controlling Publications and Social Programs).

It is true that in one of his books, published just about that time, Mieczyslaw Rakowski said that the existence of censorship in a socialist country toward the end of the 20th century was sheer anachronism. In the given situation,

however, no proposal was advanced (not even by Solidarity) for the abolition of the institution of censorship.* The legislators set as their objective the enactment of clear and overt regulations defining the censors' rights and obligations.

Most publications and periodicals must be submitted for censorship prior to their publication. The list of exemptions was narrowed in the summer of 1983. For example, the in-house bulletins of trade unions and other organizations were removed from the list of exemptions. It was frankly stated that some people had abused the exemptions, that in 1981 the Sejm had been under pressure to enact the bill granting the exemptions, but now the situation was being remedied. However, the Sejm's journal would remain exempt from censorship (it is published as a supplement to the official gazette). This was a matter of principle: an organ of public administration must not be allowed to censor the utterances of members of the supreme organ of state power. The Chief Office of Publications was placed under the Council of State. The explanation of this subordination is that the office, had it been placed under the executive branch (the Council of Ministers), could have been forced to suppress criticism of government organs in the press, which is not its task.

The essential principles on which censorship operates are as follows:

--Overtness. The law lists what the Chief Office of Publications may ban. Of course, there could be disputes over interpretation because the wording of some of the provisions is fairly general, but everyone can learn of the rules and prohibitions. Furthermore, the censors may ban only text--either a portion or an entire article--but not the title and the name of the author. In other words, the writer cannot be silenced: as I have indicated earlier, practically everyone can find an editorial office willing to publish him.

*It will be worth mentioning an interesting episode during the Sejm's session on 28 July 1983. The journalist Karol Malczynski, an independent deputy, opposed modifying the Censorship Law of 1981. In response to his sharply worded speech, two other deputies spoke out in support of the bill. Then Professor Jan Szczepanski, the renowned sociologist and independent deputy, requested the floor and said that it was a mistake and illusion to believe that censorship protected the regime. He cited a series of historical examples to prove that very strict censorship never strengthened the given regime anywhere; to the contrary, objectively "strict censorship was always an ally of the revolutionary movements . . . Have we forgotten the precept of historical materialism that repression in a country where the situation is explosive hastens the explosion, instead of preventing it? Prior censorship of a repressive nature is a dialectic factor in the self-destruction of systems incapable of developing and of defending their own values in open struggle . . . This is not a political speech, merely an explanation. And now let us vote." Even after this speech, a majority of the Sejm passed the modification of the Censorship Law, which meant a certain tightening of its provisions. Nine independent deputies--including three journalists, and the three deputies of the Polish Catholic Social Union--voted against the bill. The 19 abstentions included nine deputies of the Democratic Party, four deputies of the United Peasant Party, a writer who was a member of the PZPR, and five independent deputies, among them Professor Halina Skibniewska, one of the Sejm's deputy chairmen.

--The possibility of appeal. The censor's decision is considered a public administration decision, from which there is appeal to the Public Administration Court, which must decide the appeal in summary proceedings. Since this section was suspended under martial law, there is no experience of its application.

--The editorial office has the right to indicate the place where the censor deleted something. Not by means of white spots, but with dashes (---), noting the number of the section cited in the justification of the deletion. For it is likewise a part of overtness that the censor must justify his ban in writing, indicating the section and paragraph of the law that apply. The papers published by the party's publishing house do not exercise this right. But the other papers--the Catholic press, for example--do.

The next phase of this legislative work is the Press Law, the draft of which was made public in the summer of 1983. The legislative bill states that freedom of speech and freedom of the press must serve public interest, and it is the duty of the press to strengthen constitutional order in the Polish People's Republic. At the same time the state organs must ensure the prerequisites for the functioning of the press, including the exposition of different editorial programs, topics and standpoints. (Dissemination of approved published material that has passed through censorship may not be restricted because of its policy or content.) State organs and enterprises--and also social organizations and other institutions--are obliged to inform the press about their work, with the exclusion of state and official secrets. ("This applies to those managers who treat journalists as unauthorized trespassers," said Deputy Premier Rakowski during the first reading of the bill in the Sejm.) Within the limits of the law and in the public interest, the press may criticize any negative phenomenon. The prevention or suppression of this is prohibited, and the criticism must be answered. Who by illegal force or threat compels a journalist to report or to refrain from reporting something, or prevents or suppresses criticism in any other way, is guilty of a crime punishable by up to 3 years' imprisonment.

The legislative bill defines the journalist's vocation as service to the state and society. An important passage, included in response to the debates of 1980 and 1981, states that "freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and the freedom to be creative and to criticize do not absolve the journalist from his duty as an employee to pursue the editorial program and policy set by the paper's owner, the managing organ." In other words, the policy of a paper is set not by the journalists, but by the publisher or owner of the paper, and by the editor in chief who represents the owner; the editorial offices do not have this kind of self-government. Basically this is fairly obvious, yet experience necessitated the inclusion of this provision in the bill. It is an entirely different question--and therefore the reference to individual freedoms is not perfunctory--that the person who cannot or does not want to meet these requirements at his present place of employment has fairly wide opportunity, as I have already indicated, to find an editorial office whose policy is more suitable.

An interesting issue in conjunction with the gathering of material is that the managers of institutions and enterprises must enable the journalist to gather information also among their workers. At the request of the interviewee, any

direct quotation from him must be presented to him in writing, before publication. But he cannot demand to see in advance the text of the journalist's report or commentary, and he cannot make this a condition of his permission to publish what he communicated to the journalist. During the drafting of the bill there was considerable controversy over the confidentiality of a journalist's sources. In comparison with the government's draft, the new association of journalists proposed tighter rules and fewer exceptions. The bill introduced in the Sejm states that a journalist may by all means keep secret his source if the source requests him to do so, or if revelation could cause harm to third persons. The only exceptions are the cases specified in the law. Otherwise neither the police nor the courts can force a journalist to reveal his source. (Of course, he may do so voluntarily, on the basis of his own judgment.) An interesting novelty is that a Press Council will be formed, attached to the Council of Ministers; and that, in principle, also individuals may be licensed as publishers, not only legal entities. (I do not think that such publishers will be very common in practice.)

The law and the statutory regulations are merely a framework, but I believe that the outlined provisions are of great importance and indicate that the quoted passage from the resolution of the party congress is being implemented.

Has the Polish press regained its credibility? It is difficult to answer this question unambiguously. Today at 7:30 pm no one puts his television set in the window with the screen facing outward, and the people are again buying newspapers. (Admittedly, the papers are never sold out and there are returns, but the significant decline of real wages and the sharp rise of paper prices also play a role in this.) However, political consolidation and the restoration of confidence in the party are proceeding slowly. And after the initial period of general mistrust, the public's attitude to newspapers has become strongly differentiated. In other words, there are newspapers (here I have the "official" press in mind) that are again respected and believed, because honest and talented journalists regained this respect and credibility, even by striving to gain acceptance of martial law, a painful situation that the majority finds difficult to accept. And there remain also weak papers whose staff has reverted to complacency once the "danger" was over, ranting empty phrases instead of presenting arguments, and believing that some commissar will decree the restoration of the people's confidence. There are a few outstanding and experienced journalists in the administration of the press; but making the methods more prudent and more effective, as discussed already at the congress, is not proceeding easily.

But one thing is certain: the period of the "propaganda of success" is over. The leadership of the PZPR, together with all its allies, is now striving for successful propaganda, for fruitful work in the dissemination of information and in winning support.

1014

CSO: 2500/164

REGULATION FOR ADMISSION TO UNIVERSITIES CHANGED

Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 2 Jan 84 p 2

[Change in Regulation on Student Admissions in 1984-1985]

[Text] The regulation on student admissions to higher educational institutions needed changing as was demonstrated by the experience of many years. The task of improving it stemmed from the Theses on the Development of Education in Our Country, from the decisions of the 12th BCP Congress and from the directives of Comrade Todor Zhivkov in his speeches, reports and statements.

The new regulation on student admissions to higher educational institutions in the Bulgarian People's Republic and on authorization for Bulgarian citizens to study in VUZ's [higher educational institutions] abroad during the 1984-1985 academic year has already been approved. The basic changes in it have as their purpose the following:

¶To give secondary-education graduates of past years the right to be candidates for enrollment in VUZ's even in cases where the necessary length of service is interrupted.

¶To give an opportunity for candidacy at several similar higher educational institutions.

¶To provide free choice of specialty to those desiring to study by correspondence, with no requirement that the specialty they prefer be in line with the position they hold.

¶To introduce an equal ratio of males and females in VUZ enrollment. Exceptions shall be permitted only for specialties where the character of the work necessitates preferences.

¶To introduce identical admission requirements for Bulgarian students in the country and abroad regardless of where they completed their secondary education.

Students shall be admitted to higher educational institutions by professional divisions. (A professional division lumps together a group of specialties with a common scientific basis. At the beginning students will receive instruction

together, but at the end of the first stage they will be classified by specialties according to the aptitudes they have displayed during their studies. In cases where special training begins as early as the first stage of instruction, students will be admitted by specialties. This applies to the university and pedagogical VUZ's, to the higher medical institutes in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Pleven and Stara Zagora, to the higher institutes of economics, the Bulgarian State Conservatory, the Higher Institute of Theatrical Art, the Higher Institute of Representational Art and the Higher Institute of Musical Pedagogy in Plovdiv.)

We shall publish additional details regarding the regulation in a subsequent issue of the newspaper.

6474

CSO: 2200/68

PROFESSOR COMMENTS ON LOW BIRTH RATE

Sofia NARODNA MLADEZH in Bulgarian 4 Jan 84 p 4

[Interview with Prof Nikola Naumov, head of Demographic Research Laboratory at Karl Marx Higher Institute of Economics, by Darina Mladenova; date and place not given: "What is Necessary for us to Reach 9 Million?"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] [Question] /Comrade Naumov, would you please indicate the basic demographic characteristics of the Bulgarian people?/

[Answer] Let me dwell on some of them. As for sex distribution, there is a normal equilibrium that makes possible marital partnering.

As for age structure of the population, the aging process has intensified very rapidly during the past 30 years. In 1950 the rising generation (from 0 to 14 years) constituted 26.8 percent of the entire population and in 1980 only 22.2 percent, whereas the percentage of old people (over 60 years of age) was respectively 10.2 and 15.8 during the same years. The prospect by the year 2000 is for 20.3 percent rising generation and 19.9 percent people over 60 years of age.

/The alarming trends in the growth of unmarried and free cohabitation of young people that have emerged in a number of Western countries are not observable. It is something else that arouses uneasiness in our country--the increase in the number of divorces and illegitimate children. Corresponding to the 66,539 marriages contracted in 1981 there were 13,252 divorces, 7878 of which (about 60 percent) involved young families in which the wives were under 35 years of age.

/As for the birth rate, the facts are not heartening. In 1982 it was 13.9 per 1000.

/The death rate among our population is low. We are among the countries with the lowest death rate in the world. During the period from 1945 to 1948 the average lifespan for men and women taken together was 53.5 years; in 1981 it was already 71.5 years. Infant mortality dropped from 94.5 per 1000 in 1950 to 18.2 per 1000 in 1982./

[Question] /What are the main demographic problems in our country? In what way might their gradual solution be accomplished?/

[Answer] The main problem is /the decline in the birth rate/. The solution of this is incorporated as a goal in our demographic policy. The orientation of the Bulgarian family today is towards one or two--increasingly more rarely towards three or more--children. During the past 3 years the indices of integral fertility have fallen below 2.00, which is insufficient to ensure simple reproduction of the generations. What is needed for this purpose is a coefficient of at least 2.10-2.15.

/Unless an increase in the birth rate occurs, between 1990 and 1995 we are threatened with arriving at zero growth and gradually going over to negative population growth./ This is the basic problem, which as a trend is common to almost the whole of Europe.

Another pressing problem is the depopulation of a number of rayons and conurbation systems. This is a consequence of the urbanization processes involving the rapid development of productive forces and the building of a modern economic structure in our country. These entirely positive phenomena are accompanied here and there by negative trends manifested in the distortion of the age structure. In many rayons the number of inhabitants of reproductive and able-bodied age has declined to such a degree that simple reproduction is impossible. From 1975 up till now the natural growth of the rural population has been negative. There is a considerable number of conurbation systems where a trend towards gradual depopulation is emerging, even without further emigration.

The great task that we set for selves with the building and development of the conurbation systems and that is incorporated in Decree No. 22 of the BCP Central Committee and the Council of Ministers is /to ensure conditions that will result in young people settling in these "aging" rayons/.

The third problem which gives rise to concern has to do with /the death rate/. We have made great strides in reducing it, as I have already mentioned, but a certain standstill has been observable since the beginning of the 1970's. Among the male population, for example, there has been no increase in the average lifespan. The reasons lie mainly in cardiovascular diseases and traumatic injuries (occupational and transportation accidents etc.). Infant mortality, though significantly lowered, is still high in comparison with the most advanced countries (in some of these it is by now about 6 per 1000, three times lower than in our country). It is difficult for me to specify the reasons; on this score, medicine must speak for itself, but it is clear that once low indices are reached, further reduction will proceed more slowly.

Given this situation, no growth in the population of reproductive and able-bodied age is discernible--at least until the year 2000. As a consequence of these trends, further intensification of /the aging of the nation/, both relatively and absolutely, is expected. By the end of the century we will have another 300,- to 400,000 people of pension age. Our society must adapt to this process, and adaptation has many aspects. Especially urgent is the question of

the reintegration of elderly people into socioeconomic life, which must be adapted to their specific capabilities and be economically efficient.

All these trends can be counteracted mainly by raising the birth rate. This would also result in a decline in the aging of the nation and in a rise in the reproductive contingent and in the population of able-bodied age.

[Question] /What, in your opinion, are the underlying reasons--medical and social--for our inadequate birth rate?/

[Answer] I believe that the reasons are primarily social.

Economic and social development itself gradually leads to the formation of a new value system in people. This system includes so-called reproductive behavior which is an expression of people's view about the number of children in the family. What with the sweeping readjustments that have taken place in our country, obviously a reproductive behavior has been formed that is not in favor of a large number of children. This by no means signifies a foreordained low birth rate. The low birth rate itself has various degrees and within its range levels exist that would ensure expanded reproduction. This is precisely what we have in mind in the goals set in our demographic policy of rearing two or three children in every family.

According to research, what is decisive for the low birth rate are the wife's work load, the housing problem and other factors. The family must increasingly be given more appreciable economic assistance in its reproductive function; support of the rising generation must be more and more fully assumed by society, and things must be made easier for the wife and mother. In all other areas of social life equality of rights is a fact; in the family alone it still is not--here the wife is very much more burdened than the husband. Active educational work along these lines is needed among young people, and not enough attention is being paid to it, it seems to me.

[Question] /Is what is being done to raise the birth rate in our country sufficient and effective at the moment and in the long term?/

[Answer] We have had favorable experience with the demographic policy of encouraging the birth rate. But it must be developed further, updated and improved if we are to get out of the low-birthrate zone. Incidentally, measures along these lines are incorporated as general policy in a number of party and state documents--the decisions of the December (1972) plenum, the decision of the Political Bureau of the BCP Central Committee of 6 March 1973 "On elevating the role of women in building the developed socialist society," Comrade Todor Zhivkov's speech to the Ninth Congress of Bulgarian Trade Unions etc.

Foreign and Bulgarian experience shows that the only effective method is a comprehensive approach, /comprehensive assistance/ to the family. We can create all kinds of aids; if we omit one, the others lose the force of their influence too. And in the long term it is difficult to say; categorical forecasts are not possible in this sphere of social life.

[Question] /Recently voices have increasingly been heard against certain administrative measures undertaken for the purpose of raising the birth rate--institution of severe restrictions on abortions and intervention of public opinion in the solution of the family's most personal problem (number of children and the time of their birth), extension of the application of the bachelors' tax to members of families that remain childless for more than 2 years etc. What is your opinion on the question?/

[Answer] I believe that coercive measures cannot solve these complex questions. We have available to us the experience of several countries. Temporary "achievements" in this area create a lot of complex problems for society later on. So-called demographic booms (high births) show up that exacerbate for a certain period the problem of children's institutions and schools, personnel for them, jobs etc., with no overall change of the demographic situation.

Not to mention the fact that these provisions are contrary to the fundamental principles of our society. They violate the principle of a person's freedom, proclaimed in our demographic policy, to decide when to have children and how many. The decision of the Political Bureau of the BCP Central Committee, dated 6 March 1973, emphasizes that "socialist society recognizes and prizes motherhood and will assist mother and family in rearing and educating children. It adheres to the principle that the family alone has a right to decide how many children to have and when they shall be born." The administrative measures are neither necessary nor effective. Since fundamentally the processes are socially determined, we have to influence them by corresponding social measures.

[Question] /Contraceptives, whose mass use in many countries in the world has by now proved their physiological safety and great medical and social benefit, are still inadequately distributed in our country. Do you not believe that their mass use would contribute to the solution of a number of social and demographic questions?/

[Answer] Whether contraceptives are harmful or harmless to the organism is for medicine to say. At any rate there must be such means lest unwanted pregnancies and abortions ensue. This must become part of people's sexual education. If contraceptives are used with the necessary know-how and are actually harmless, they will result in helping solve the problem of the family and the problem of demographic development.

[Question] /Is there coordination between the demographic policy and the sexual and family-and-marriage education of young people? Where are the "sore" spots in this area?/

[Answer] It seems to me that educational work among young people has not been placed on a sufficiently broad scientific basis and is not well organized and purposeful. There should be educational activity in the schools, the Komsomol and the army that is oriented towards the family and its future.

The rising generation is educated by parents, by the Komsomol and by the school. The classroom teacher is not always in a position competently to present the subjects of sexual and family-and-marriage relations. What is needed is the highly skilled activity of personnel trained in this specific area. The agencies and the organizations concerned--both the Ministry of National Education and the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union as well as scientific research institutes etc.--must lay stress on this in their work.

[Question] /When is it expected that the 9 millionth inhabitant of our country will be born?/

[Answer] According to present calculations, around 1990. It depends, though, on the long-term development of the birth rate.

6474

CSO: 2200/68

ROLE OF CULTURE IN SOCIALISM ASSESSED

Prague NOVA MYSL in Slovak No 12, Nov 83 pp 124-132

[Article by Dalimir Hajko, member of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Slovak Academy of Sciences: "Cultural Revolution and Building of Developed Socialism"]

[Text] Culture--and cultural values as its content--undergoes a continuous process of development in socialist society. The criterion for the relevance of a specific value to the sphere of culture is the criterion of progress as a process in which man achieves an ever increasing measure of supremacy over nature, is more and more capable of learning about society, laws of nature and using them to the benefit of the development of humankind, and attains in this manner a greater potential for his all-round development.

Each cultural value expresses in a certain way the capability of man to improve himself, to reduce his dependence on the forces of nature and to increase the potential for controlling the social forces and relations created by man himself. Cultural values express man's activity toward the attainment of such a state. They also express to what extent man's activity is oriented toward the resolution of individual problems and difficulties obstructing the path of continued social progress.

Progress-oriented activity of people becomes reflected in the struggle of contradictory tendencies, progression and regression. According to Marxism, the relation between progression and regression is dialectical. Progress seldom proceeds in a straight line. For the most part, occasional stagnations, reversions to past state and quite often even the temporary loss of certain achievements are integral parts of it.

Socialist social relations offer the opportunity not only to resolve contradictions directly and inseparably connected with social progress, but also to create the prerequisites for correct anticipation of the direction of social development. Progress as the result of conscious, purposeful activity of an individual and of a collective also determines the prerequisites for intentional, programmed control of culture and, consequently, of the generation of cultural values which form a part of it.

The generation of cultural values in a socialist society, like social progress, is becoming the result of the conscious activity of a decisive majority of the members of such a society. In principle it can be participated in by every member of society, because society is creating realistic prerequisites for this participation in cultural life and, in principle, everybody can also have at his disposal the results of the activity within which cultural values are generated. This circumstance is reflected in Marxist theory of socialist cultural revolution as its basic postulate.

Understanding this postulate and the theoretical as well as practical consequences that derive from it in the context of cultural revolution is possible only if we view cultural revolution as a complex of qualitative changes in the life of society, as one process in a complex system of processes which jointly make up proletarian revolution. This is how V.I. Lenin viewed cultural revolution. The Leninist thesis regarding the decisive role of cultural revolution during implementation of democracy in culture and in cultural life of the entire society organically culminates in the in the concept that cultural revolution is one of the basic inevitable laws for the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism. This complementing and mutual interlinkage of these ideas bear out the fact that V.I. Lenin saw the key purport and primary function of cultural revolution in the possibility of using it as part of the creation of a new social reality.

* * *

The first stage of cultural revolution commences immediately after social and political revolution. Changed societal conditions prepare the ground for changing the cultural level of people, while a high cultural level per se need not always lead to a change in social conditions.

The first stage of cultural revolution is constituted by the democratization of culture, i.e., dissemination of the already attained cultural values, findings from all areas of culture, methods of performance and management, etc., among the widest strata of the population. That means primarily also dealing with basic tasks and providing such basic prerequisites for continued development of culture as, e.g., eradication of illiteracy, removal of formal obstacles to participation by the greatest possible number of people in sharing the highest accomplishments of culture, expansion of the network promoting and spreading cultural values and findings, creation of material prerequisites for continued cultural development, elimination of differences between city and hamlet from the viewpoint of access to cultural values, etc. Thus, in the course of the first stage of the cultural revolution process, a maximum number of cultural values which mankind as a whole created in the course of its past history become generally accepted.

This stage involves primarily the expansion of the number of people who adopted the accomplishments of world culture for their own, for whom these accomplishments became a part of their everyday life. Thus, it does not involve an immediate formation of a new proletarian culture, some "thinking up of a new proletculture" (Lenin) but such a dissemination of the best traditions, examples and results of the already existing culture that can create realistic

prerequisites for developing those results and traditions from the viewpoint of Marxist philosophy and in harmony with the conditions of life and needs for the struggle of the proletariat during the period of its dictatorship.

Systematically implemented principles of the democratization of culture are a significant attribute of cultural revolution. However, that does not mean identification of cultural revolution with its only first, initial stage that involves making cultural values and findings more accessible, their dissemination. Democratization of culture does not mean only the democratization of the consumption of cultural values, but also the democratization of their generation, which develops to its full extent at a higher stage of cultural revolution. The main cultural revolutionary act is qualitative change in the very lifestyle of the people, primarily through the application of a creative approach to all of its aspects and facets.

This makes democratization of culture the basic prerequisite for making the principle of creativity generally accepted and generally applied. The radical changes occurring in the process of cultural revolution must lead to improvements in the cultural and educational level of wide strata of the populace through accessibility and dissemination of cultural values and, consequently, must lead toward and promote first of all an intensification of the process of change in social life, toward shaping a new man. Revolutionary changes in culture are oriented mainly toward improving the quality of life for members of socialist society and, through this, toward creating more favorable conditions for its continued development. The capacity of culture to form a part of the revolutionary process is linked to its capacity for optimizing the existing conditions of people's lives. It consists primarily in the fact that it creates new prerequisites for the development of human society, that it participates in innovation of the conditions for the development of society and that it facilitates the attainment of a higher degree of control of natural forces, a greater extent of discovering the inevitable laws of society and a higher degree of progress.

These radically new conditions for the development of mankind that never existed in the past in any form are inseparably linked with the fact that the people, as the subject as well as object of culture, form on its ground and within its framework a system of methods and resources for activity that constitutes a substantial component of the struggle for social progress. Nevertheless, this system of methods and resources for activity is not static, its contents and scope also keep changing and developing in the course of societal development. During cultural revolution it changes in a revolutionary way.

Cultural values do not constitute static elements of cultural revolution. They constantly change their position in the system of values of socialist society, class, stratum or social group. They are of a dynamic character. The essence, the principle of this dynamism is constituted primarily by the fact that culture and cultural values spring up on the basis of needs of the socialist society, which they at the same time help to shape.

Cultural values function as co-creators of optimum conditions for viable development of society. That is their substantial feature. However, if in the process of cultural revolution some--let us say "traditional"--cultural values fail to find application as stimulating to revolution and inspiring for continued progress of cultural revolution, they do not enter this process because they gradually lose their effectiveness within it. This lack of participation need not necessarily be connected with their rejection. They can be perceived, e.g., in the context of cultural heritage, or as phenomena which do figure in helping to create the atmosphere, the "background" of cultural revolution, but are of no consequence for its progress and result.

Progress in society--which in the concept of the development of society propounded by historical materialism depends in the first place on the development of the material base of society (primarily on its economic aspect)--is directly linked to the formation of cultural values. Herein there occurs a functional relation between social progress and culture and/or cultural values that constitute one element of the complex system of phenomena deciding social progress, whereby they themselves are affected by it in reverse in their subsequent developmental period.

There can be no doubt that social progress depends to a certain extent also on the effects of cultural values. However, the avant-garde nature of, e.g., a scientific discovery, or some other result of human activity, is not constituted by the discovery itself, but is determined primarily by the possibilities and viability of finding application in society under varying social systems. The progressive development of human society in a given historical era is in a dialectical relation of mutual interaction to cultural values (dominant in the same historical era). Their development progresses simultaneously in mutual interaction.

Of key importance to the development of society and to the development of culture is active participation by man. Man's creative activity forms the basis of society's mobility while simultaneously representing the characteristic feature of culture. Active involvement by man achieves its qualitatively highest level, its apex, in social practice, because it participates within the framework of social practice in the formation of optimum conditions for the development of human society. It stands to reason that the status of the individual phenomena which participate in this development is relatively constant in each period that can be historically delineated. Evolution is relatively closed, relatively at its end. The constant result of learning about nature and society are always civilizational values, while the dynamic, processual and, from the developmental viewpoint, relative result are cultural values. Generation of cultural values is in a dialectical relation to civilizational values. Culture gives an avant-garde content and purport to that part of civilizational values which have the potential for becoming cultural values in the near or more distant future.

Cultural revolution is not a non-recurrent act, but a complex and long-lasting process. Cultural revolution in its second stage is primarily an act of qualitative change in perception of the world and in the approach to it. Within the framework of cultural revolution a stage is gradually reached in

which the qualities offered by the real culture are not just accepted more or less passively by the largest possible number of people, but in which they also distinctly influence their work, lifestyle, moral concepts and education of subsequent generations. From this viewpoint, cultural revolution cannot be but some mechanical propagation of cultural values. While the issue in the first stage of cultural revolution is a radical change in the potential for acceptance of cultural values, in its second stage it involves a change in people's lifestyle and a qualitative change occurs also in the role of workers in the cultural history process.

The essence of the changes introduced by socialism into the spiritual life of society is characterized primarily by the reorientation of culture toward meeting the internal needs of the masses. Historical advances of human society, man's ability to improve himself in the process of this historical development of humankind, the attained level of development of productive forces, all constitute the nature and quality of cultural values. However, in their very essence is already contained the need for continued exceeding of the status quo, the need for negation sufficient to bring about a subsequent higher developmental stage in the generation of cultural values, a negation that is not a mere cancellation, but which calls for constituting new values on a qualitatively higher level while creating realistic prerequisites for this process to occur.

Development in the area of cultural values is an infinite process involving interdependent stages that dialectically negate themselves; cultural development does not end by liquidation of the old, previously overridden state of culture, but creates a new stage, which in turn is overridden at a higher stage by some other, more viable developmental stage. Throughout the course of the evolution of society, the sphere of cultural values starts including also phenomena, processes, activities and institutions that in a certain way correspond to this evolution and which are commensurate with its overall trend, direction. This involves phenomena which in a given historical situation fulfill some of the criteria of progress.

However, this assertion is also valid in reverse; from among cultural values are separated, excluded, eliminated those which for some reason ceased to meet the criteria of social progress valid in a specific historical situation, which are no longer able to participate in helping to prepare the ground for the formation of radically new cultural values. At the same time it must be realized that the problem of the evolution of culture cannot be classified as merely an immanent matter of cultural logic. It represents only a single element in a complex network of problems relevant to the fact that "the viability of culture for the future must inevitably be judged also from the viewpoint of the extent to which it is capable of preserving not only itself, but all humankind and the indispensable conditions for its existence--nature, the living environment."

Participants in cultural revolution during the stage of developed socialist society must take into account all of these circumstances. At the same time, one of the key tasks of changes and processes progressing during cultural revolution is to teach people to think and work creatively, to

live creatively. To ultimately teach them to create culture, not just accept it as a sum of phenomena devised by the "elite" of creators. People must become conscious of the fact that a certain stage of civilization can be formed and overridden specifically by means of the creative application of cultural values. The more systematically such overriding takes place, the better conditions will be created for the origin and development of a new civilization as the starting point for the origin and development of a new, socialist culture. Without meeting these tasks we would be hard put to achieve the key goal of socialist cultural revolution--the formation of the socialist awareness of wide masses of the people and the creation of a new, socialist culture which expresses the interests of these masses.

Theoretical knowledge alone without relation to practical life is not sufficient in this case as well and requires that its bearers take care, as V.I. Lenin said, "that science not remain a dead letter or a fashionable phrase (and that, frankly speaking, is often the case in our country), that science truly pervade the blood of people, that it become a thoroughly out-and-out basis of their lifestyle." Similarly, in the realm of culture we can regard as accomplished and implemented only what has become an inseparable part of the everyday life of the people, what compels them to seek to constantly improve the humane forms of their life-style.

As part of building a developed socialist society it has become possible to attain the basic objectives of cultural revolution (elimination of illiteracy, familiarization of wide strata of people with basic works of the world's culture, acquisition of a sum of basic knowledge from the area of science and technology, etc.). In the current period it is not enough just to promote and intensify the implementation of these basic goals of cultural revolution. Similar actions at a higher phase of cultural revolution would cease to be bearers of culture, because while expanding the horizons of human knowledge, which then, for this specific reason, would cease to be a part of culture and become a part of the given civilization.

The term "creativity" cannot serve as a theoretical magic formula. A creative approach to problems must become manifested in the everyday work activities of the people, must pervade the entire social practice. As stated by Comrade Yuriy Andropov in his address on the occasion of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 15 June 1983, "the key productive force is, naturally, man, his work activity. By that I mean not only conscious discipline and creative approach to work, but also exact and correct organization of people's efforts and their remuneration." In this context, it is of particular importance to enhance creativity in the work process. That is where uniformity of cultural revolution and of scientific and technological progress comes most clearly to the fore. For that reason it is imperative, as also stated in the report of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee presented at the Eighth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, to make better use of hidden internal resources for the accelerated introduction of scientific and technological findings into practice, to shorten the science-technology-production-utilization cycle, to make use of all the possibilities offered by the development of scientific and technological cooperation with socialist countries, to utilize the results of worldwide science and technology, etc.

Intensification of production, introduction of new technologies, combining science and technology with production cannot be accomplished without developing socialist personality, without a creative approach to work and, consequently, also without the development of culture. "Improved effectiveness of research and its input into the resolution of basic problems of intensive development is connected primarily with the work of creative workers," states the report of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee presented at the Eighth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee. "Their work brings for the national economy results that in many cases would be irreplaceable."

One of the possibilities for scaling the threshold between "make-work" activity devoid of creativity, and productivity is also the area of sociopolitical relations and activities. Participation by wide masses in sociopolitical activity belongs among the most effective paths for overcoming the harmful lack of versatility resulting from division of labor. "It is specifically in this area that it is possible to overcome social differences between those engaged in mental and in physical work, overcome one-sided specialization, obliterate the boundaries between creative and make-work (reproductive) activity. First of all, this activity is participated in by people of various occupations, varying life experience, representatives of varying generations and social groups; second of all, this activity (unless it is bureaucratically deformed, to be sure) is organized by the participants themselves, consciously and voluntarily, i.e., it itself is a type of social relation oriented toward communism, calling for collectivism, dialogue in looking for approaches, etc.; third of all, no matter what specific task (economy, economic, control, etc.) it is oriented toward, its ultimate purpose will always be the improvement of relations among people (development of forms of social intercourse themselves)."

* * *

Socialist cultural revolution progresses simultaneously along two lines: horizontally and vertically.

From the viewpoint of developing creative activity as the primary cultural value it involves the expansion of creative activity in the production sphere and in all areas of social activity.

On the other hand, it involves the intensification and qualitative improvement of creative activity by acquiring proficiency in the new methods that make it possible to penetrate ever deeper into the structural layers of phenomena. Cultural revolution viewed in this way as one of the components of socialist revolution leads in the process of sociocultural practice to the formation of a creative approach by man to his environment and to himself as well as the postulation of the requirement for continuous development of this creative approach as the prerequisite for the continued development of human society in general and of culture in particular.

The development of culture in the process of building a developed socialist society, particularly from the viewpoint of human creativity, cannot be viewed

in isolation from the production relations and the material base of the society in which culture is developing. "The development of science and technology under conditions of building socialism principally affects the social structure of society. There occur changes in the character and increased volume of highly qualified labor, the extent of physically exhausting labor is reduced, new occupations spring up, there occurs elimination of the differences between physical and mental work. There is an increasing need for acquiring new knowledge, demands on precision, reliability, work discipline and quality of work keep increasing. This calls at the same time for adequate appreciation for the production technology and the R&D base, the human potential itself, the intellectual technical creativity of scientific and engineering cadres, as well as of workers, their professional skill, know-how and dexterity," states the report of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee presented at the Eighth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee.

The alienation that manifested itself in a class society as the result of exploitative production relations obstructed the development of the creative capabilities of wide strata of people. It prevented them from developing primarily as part of the work process and, consequently, prevented also the participation of wide strata of the populace in cultural creative activity.

What counts in the process of cultural revolution is that not only the acquisition and utilization of cultural values, but also their further development--and primarily the latter--cease to be a matter of concern to only a narrow stratum of people, but that an opportunity for contribution be afforded to all those who show sufficient talent and interest. The point is that in its ultimate consequence active participation in the generation of cultural values become a part of the everyday work of individuals, so that it can become an integral part of social practice, its essential component, and thus contribute to improving the workers' standard of living. It is so because--in the words of Comrade Yuriy Andropov--the concept of standard of living also includes "a constant growth in the consciousness and culture of people, including the culture of living, conduct, as well as what I would call the culture of sensible consumption. This includes also exemplary public order, health, economic nutrition as well as providing high-quality services to the populace (where in our country, as we all know, things are still far from perfect). From the moral and esthetic viewpoint this also includes thoroughly effective utilization of spare time. Briefly put, all that which can be summarily called socialist civilized conduct."

8204

CSO: 2400/165

GOALS FOR ARMED FORCES INNOVATOR ORGANIZATIONS

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 1, 1984 (signed to press 11 Nov 83)
pp 1-3

[Edited version of the speech given by Col General W. Fleissner, deputy minister for national defense and chief, technology and armaments, at the Innovator Conference of the NVA (National People's Army) on the occasion of the 26th Central Fair of the Masters of Tomorrow in Leipzig, 15 Nov 83: "The Achievements of our Innovators--a Countering Factor Against the Confrontation Course of Imperialism"]

[Text] The current international situation is marked, above all, by an unprecedented intensification of the adventurous and dangerous tendencies in imperialist, especially U.S., policy. That is accompanied by an unexampled arms buildup by NATO, in which the latest science and technology data are maximally being used.

Above all, the deployment of the new grade of U.S. missile potential in Western Europe is meant to provide NATO with serious military superiority on our continent.

The attack on Grenada signaled the transition of U.S. imperialism to a new stage in using force on the international level. Wherever it envisages military successes already possible, it invests its military might brutally in the course toward the world domination it is seeking. In complete regions on the earth, U.S. imperialism relentlessly seeks to reverse social progress in every way and suppress the peoples without pity. This imperialist barbarism is documented by the events in the Caribbean, Latin America, the south of Africa and, above all, in the Near East. The extraordinary risk of this course lies in the traditional eccentricity of U.S. imperialism in expanding such hotbeds into widespread global conflagrations.

The chief imperialist alliance, NATO, is supposed to be pressed into a still stiffer war course. Eventually, through still more consistently using the scientific-technical and economic potentials of the NATO member states and through the development and application of new weapons technologies, they want to ensure U.S. world domination and destroy socialism still in this century. Unbridled anticommunist hysteria and an incomparable psychological crusade against socialism are meant to create the ideological prerequisites for it.

All that demands very quick and adequate responses of us which the enemy can perceive. A clear challenge it is to the socialist armed forces, to all soldiers and, hence, also to all innovators.

If we want to carry on in this situation our military tasks in securing socialism and reliably preserving the peace, enemy military superiority must not be permitted. That gives an immediate significance to the innovator movement in our armed forces. Innovator achievements become an immediate countering factor against the confrontation course of imperialism.

This means: The innovators in our armed forces, as all others who are in charge, now face the need to provide themselves with what is in principle a new view on the political-ideological assessment of the innovator movement and their own attitude toward it.

On 2 November 1983, the minister for national defense affirmed that our own adjustment to NATO's increased aggressive intent and capability first and foremost was a requirement made on our soldiers' class consciousness. That includes the problem about the achievements our innovators can add to this class contest to secure socialism and turn back the confrontation course of imperialism.

In view of that, all we came up with at the 26th ZMMM [Central Fair of the Masters of Tomorrow] has, in one sense, exhibited great political maturity. But then we also have to ask ourselves whether that was already all we could achieve.

There is one thing every innovator must realize at all times (whether it involves his own project or his promoting the innovator movement as such): In view of the ever more destructive weapons in the hands of the enemies of peace and the progress of humanity, our innovators have increasingly more reason for contributing by concrete deeds to the improvement of our country's defense readiness.

Innovator Balance Sheet in the Karl Marx Year

The innovator balance sheet in the Karl Marx Year has something to show for. The innovator and MMM movement has gained in breadth and effectiveness. The tasks assigned to it were purposefully realized. Right now, 27,000 soldiers, border soldiers and civilian employees are involved in innovator work in nearly 10,000 innovator and youth innovator collectives. Circa 17,000 innovations of theirs have significantly contributed to enhancing the fighting strength and combat readiness. Worthy of special mention are the following:

--The contribution to the boosting of fighting strength and combat readiness became more measurable.

--Some 42 percent of all innovations are tasks of the innovator plans.

--Collective efforts make up a greater proportion of innovator achievements.

--More effective use was made of the mental and material potential in our army.

--Most initiatives aimed at training intensification, the rationalization of the maintenance and repair of arms and equipment, and a more efficient use of all material and financial resources.

--Many innovations make use of microelectronics. The scientific-technical level of innovations has risen on the whole.

--The development of new training devices, such as teaching models and visual aids, trainers and simulators, helps cope with modern combat equipment and arms rapidly and securely.

--Especially valuable are innovations that take account of given concrete and technical conditions and deal with operational procedures.

These are positive tendencies that absolutely have to be carried further.

Of the 90 innovator exhibits at the 26th ZMMM, 35 percent aided training, 21 percent used microelectronics, and 70 percent led to partly very significant and accountable savings. All innovations presented show a high scientific-technical level and were manufactured in excellent quality. More than half of them directly contribute to the rationalization of the training and repair processes.

The 26th ZMMM also produced evidence that the political organs, party, FDJ and trade union organizations are exercising more of an influence on the development of innovator and MMM work, especially on expanding its mass base and promoting youth innovator collectives. We are especially glad that the youth innovator movement has improved its profile in the armed forces.

As combat techniques, arms and equipment in our armed forces embody values at billions today and their use requires great material and financial resources, it is a demand of public responsibility and military-economic reason to apply training tools at a maximum range. That allows military equipment to be effectively used at a rapid pace. Training intensification therefore appears to us as the main thrust in the military innovator movement.

Even so, our annual balance sheets also indicate that innovators must still more be oriented to the problems in material and time economy in all sectors and that results must be made applicable still more rapidly and comprehensively.

Some Remarks on Particular Experiences and Results

With respect to the development of trainers and simulators for combat training, many excellent experiences have occurred at the Ernst Thaelmann ground forces officers school. Within the last 4 years, 26 developments were completed there, nine of them in cooperation with enterprises in the economy. The youth innovator collective under Lt Col H. Bauer developed an antiaircraft operational headquarters for training purposes. It greatly improved the training for the officer candidates, saved original equipment and 6,000 liter in diesel fuel and 1,500 liter in gasoline annually. This innovation was shown at the 26th ZMMM.

Also mentioned must be the achievements of the collective under the "distinguished inventor" Major Lotze. This is a pacemaker for the innovator and MMM movement in the rear services and an initiator of the innovator contest in the NVA [National People's Army]. Thus far, this collective has brought out 112 innovations on a high scientific-technical level and of great military benefit. M 653,000 have been saved. Major Lotze has had a crucial share in the formation of stable innovator collectives and the inclusion of young soldiers in youth innovator activity. Since 1972, this collective has been represented at the ZMMM with at least one exhibit every year. This year they showed four exhibits, one of which was put in for a patent registration.

The youth innovator collective of Captain B. Alisch of LSK/LV [air force/air defense] showed a training device for radar which perceptibly improves the training for operations personnel and helps save in the troop component 30,000 kWh of electrical energy per year.

The youth innovator collective under senior warrant officer Voss is one of the most active ones in the navy and was represented at the 26th ZMMM with a top achievement--a "partly automated radar reception installation." That releases manpower and makes possible using the equipment available much more intensively.

From the area of the border troops of the GDR comes the innovator collective of Major Gumz. Thus far it has submitted 130 innovations for rationalizing the repair of motor vehicles which have provided high military benefits and savings of circa M 110,000. The collective has exhibited several innovations at the ZMMM and is working closely together with members of Soviet partner units.

I should like to single out achievements by innovators who has already taken part in the inventors movement. The inventors competition initiated in the 1982/83 training year has motivated their invention activity. Thus far, 37 scientific-technical achievements have been registered for patents in the course of it. In the entire 1981/82 training year there had only been 21.

Some remarks, in this context, about the new patent law that takes effect on 1 January 1984. It sets down basic tasks for the development of invention activity and must thus be given appropriate attention by every superior officer with leadership functions for innovators and inventors. The stimulating effect of the law on innovator and inventor collectives mainly lies in the clear definition for those inventions that show a degree of maturity making them worthy of receiving patent protection. Such inventions are technical solutions that excel by novelty, industrial applicability and technical progress, based on some invention. That provides our inventors with target criteria that clearly define the patent maturity degree and give incentives for coming up to it.

This now concerns mainly our youth research collectives. I am sure those collectives will develop still more in the future. This appeal is of course addressed particularly at our military college institutions and institutes. In them, these collectives should primarily be composed of young military specialists, technical school and college graduates and officer candidates. We should like to see that this is reflected already at the 27th ZMMM by a greater number of patented or patent-ready displays. All commanding officers and chiefs be advised at this point: It is an important task for them to carry inventions all the way through to the point of patent maturity.

The MMM's of our formations and teaching institutions unfortunately still showed in 1983 vast disparities in innovator work. Typical of the more than 3,000 displays presented were their better grade and the endeavor there to achieve higher military and economic benefits. A top group in the innovator movement could clearly be identified. It is, by and large, made up of the Moeckel ground forces formation, the Griesbach naval formation, the Jansen formation of the border troops of the GDR, and the LSK/LV ground forces officers colleges.

Two things have to be said about that clearly: For one thing, such divergencies in development suggest there are enormous reserves. And then, all those in charge of the innovator movement may keep in mind that experience exchange here too is the cheapest investment.

The causes for serious level disparities are normally found in
--diverse political-ideological positions taken on innovator work,
--drops in the leadership level, and
--considerable quality differences, in part, in the planning of innovator activity.

In this context, there are interesting experiences gathered during the political-ideological and leadership-related preparations for socialist competition in the 1983/84 training year.

Picking up on the fine experiences and achievements of last year's competition initiator for the civilian employees in the NVA, the idea was to lead to the top this year from a middle position a repair unit as competition initiator. That was only possible if the innovators took the place in it they deserved.

The competition appeal in this unit, compared with last year's, shows some noteworthy differences which, among other things, reflect the growing importance of the innovator movement. While last year the first key point of the appeal dealt with boosting labor productivity as such and with quality work, the initiators this year from the outset address an accelerated rationalization of the labor processes by means of new technologies and methods in scientific labor organization. This means: The innovators are being appealed to from the start by the high expectations the public puts on their accomplishments.

Three further comments about this appeal:

--New technologies demand a broad application of the methods in scientific-technical labor organization. The innovator movement and purposeful political, military and technical leadership must thus become more inseparable from one another than ever before. If the innovator movement is led incorrectly, it misses the basic targets that matter today. And then it misses the high benefit and effect we must and can expect.

--High combat readiness and fighting strength are the most important goals of socialist competition and performance comparisons. Before an innovator tackles a new task, he must check his intention under that aspect. In innovator work also, that which advances our combat readiness has priority. That of course is mainly a matter of leadership in the innovator movement from the top, the commanders, chiefs, party, FDJ and trade union organizations.

--Based on direct guidelines and concrete requirements, the competition initiators seek more effective solutions for repair processes within the scope of collective innovator work according to plan.

This appeal for conducting socialist competition in 1983/84 illuminates what is of directional character and has to be emphasized:

--The main concern are more effective solutions for the total processes in any given activity--here, in our concrete case, for repair processes. What speeds up these processes most and brings the greatest benefits has priority as an innovator achievement.

--Innovator work has to go according to plan. Planned progress most readily makes for rapid multiple use. Finally, planned innovator work makes for high moral incentives for innovators or the innovator collectives themselves. Thereby we do by no means wish to place in doubt the intuition in the innovator's planned production process. Intuition often leads to insights gaining a significance of new planning magnitudes.

--That is why we are mainly concerned with collective innovator work. The competition initiator, e.g., has decided that at least 75 percent of all innovations must be accomplished collectively. That is quite remarkable for the conditions there.

In connection with this leadership example, a point has to be made of the role of mass organizations, here mainly that of the civilian employees trade union. It contributes considerably to preparing competition documentation and to mobilizing the civilian employees.

An important spot in the innovator and MMM movement goes to the ever closer collaboration with the rationalizers and inventors in GSSD [Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG)]. Measures like joint innovator conferences and consultations, experience exchanges, and the handing on of innovations and documents are carried out at an ever larger scope. In the ground forces, such collaboration has clearly increased in comparison with last year. While in the 1981/82 training year, still only 26 joint innovations were recorded, this year the number had risen to 72. The Zabelt formation has had a great share in it with 16 joint developments. The variously tried and tested and firm ties our own innovators and inventors have to those in the GSSD are going to be reinforced further in the future on behalf of high fighting strength and combat readiness for safeguarding peace and socialism.

Some experiences which in a special way point in the right direction:

--It is normal for us that much of the personnel changes twice a year. Continuity is ensured though through the collectivity in innovator work. That also depends on proper leadership for innovator work.

--More and more young people, 23 years of age, and reservists also are called in who in their job development have had experiences and interests in innovator work already. That is an impulse the significance of which we cannot even properly assess as yet. Expert innovator movement leadership must get maximum use out of it.

--Performance comparison among collectives normally is of greater benefit than among individual innovators. The 26th ZMMM brought that out clearly, too.

Which Tasks Do Our Innovators Face for the 1983/84 Training Year?

The characteristic mark of all innovator activity in the 35th year of the GDR ought to be the saving of public expenditures and a plus in public benefit. What it comes down to simply is to get more out of less.

As an innovator in our armed forces one must be aware of this: If today the necessary material public funds multiply through replacing one generations of weapons by the next, such a task can economically be coped with only through scientific-technical progress all down the line.

Objectively, that still more places in the foreground the demand to achieve useable important public results as fast as possible and put them effectively into practical operations just as fast.

In the 19 October 1983 SED Central Committee secretariat resolution, on the "State and Results of the Innovator Movement and Inferences for its Further Development," it is demanded, not by chance, "that the scientific-technical level and the efficiency demands on innovator work be emphatically elevated."

Under proven party leadership, the innovator movement in the GDR armed forces is oriented to further important performance improvements in the 35th year of the GDR.

Based on the results of the 1983/84 training year, innovator work is steadily being further developed in quality with the aim of making a growing contribution to the effort for scientific-technical top achievements and their all-inclusive military utilization. Derived from the orders issued for the new training year and relying on the 19 October 1983 SED Central Committee secretariat resolution referred to, my guideline for 1984/85 up to the next innovator conference focuses on solving the following tasks:

1. Ensuring a high leadership and organizational level in our innovator and MMM movement while further developing its basic political concern. One must always consider that dedication essentially grows out of the requirements and comprehension of the international situation. High demands placed on the ideological level of our innovator and MMM movement thus amounts to higher demands on our leadership quality.
2. A higher scientific-technical level of innovator activity and its being oriented to top achievements, connected with a purposeful further development of cooperative work, with special encouragement for youth innovator and youth research collectives. Doing away with unjustified high level disparities deserves special attention.
3. A rapid realization and effective introduction of innovations to the troops and ensuring an efficient multiple use of proven innovations.

4. Having innovators and inventors focus more still on
--military training intensification through a priority development of trainers and simulators,
--ensuring a high grade of technical safety, and
--the most efficient use and saving of energy, materials, spare parts, fuels and lubricants.

A still more prudent composition of the innovator collectives and genuine performance comparisons among them are important keys for the advances needed for the future. Our armed forces have all it takes for that.

The most important job our innovators have is their contribution to the reliable safeguarding of socialism and peace. All their capacities and experiences they are investing in it, it being their class mission.

Our best wishes for their success are with them!

5885

CSSO: 2300/256

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

DRAMA CONTENT REVISION URGED--As the East Berlin dramaturge and critic, Prof Ernst Schumacher, has stated, laborers and the working world rarely appear in contemporary GDR drama, and this contravenes the SED's emphatic demands. Representations of human behavior directly relating to production processes in the developed socialist society have "rather declined in number," or, in any case, comprise an "absolute minority" among current productions. Dramatic art's "abstaining" from the presentation of labor as the "most significant activity in human life" is "the result of the predominant preference for presenting misguided social behavior." According to Schumacher, the reason for this "abstention" may be "that work is felt by most people, regardless of whether they do physical or intellectual labor, to be 'hard labor', and is perceived more as an unavoidable necessity than as an innate urge, more as an exertion and a burden than as a delight." This results in a disinclination to having to occupy one's free time enjoying dramatic art which portrays this very same work. All the same, Schumacher asserted that the dramatists of the 1980's should derive their problems, content, conflicts and characters "far more clearly from the 'core' of socialist life, labor itself, and make [it] interesting for audiences."

[Text] [Bonn IWE TAGESDIENST in German No 8, 20 Jan 84 culture supplement p 1]

CSO: 2300/251

ITALIAN-HUNGARIAN LABOR UNIONS ISSUE JOINT DECLARATION

Rome RASSEGNA SINDICALE in Italian 9 Dec 83 p 47

[Text] A delegation of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], consisting of Luciano Lama, secretary general, Ottaviano Del Turco, assistant secretary general and Michele Magno, head of the International Office, were the guests in Budapest from 21 to 23 November of the secretary general of the Central Council of Hungarian Trade Unions (SZOT), Sandor Gaspar. The delegation engaged in a long conference with the first secretary of the CC of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Janos Kadar. During the meetings which were conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and sincerity, the discussion dealt with the situation of the economies and the unions of the two countries, and comparisons were made between the respective points of view with regard to problems, especially those concerned with peace and disarmament. We publish herewith the joint declaration of the unions as follows.

The CGIL and the SZOT express their grave concern about the deterioration of international relations and in view of the pronounced instability of relations between the East and the West, confirm the need that priority be given to the union initiative directed in all countries toward the safeguarding of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation among peoples.

It is essential to take a vigorous stand against the tendency to solve political conflicts among states by means of military force. The latter must be replaced by seeking a dialogue and a method of negotiation and reciprocal trust as the indispensable instruments of a just system for the conduct of international relations.

The CGIL and the SZOT express their great alarm at the resumption of the arms race, which among other things intensifies the crisis situation of international monetary reserves, because of the enormous financial expenditures that it imposes upon the world.

The CGIL and the SZOT express their firm conviction that common survival in the nuclear age is a matter to be entrusted to a policy of control and arms reduction at the lowest possible level, a policy which sees in the immediate future the noninstallation of new missiles in Europe and a start toward a substantial dismantling of those already in place.

The CGIL and the SZOT stress the need that the union movement of the entire continent undertake political initiatives and initiatives directed toward the mobilization of the workers in favor of a peace based on reciprocal security and which will gradually lead to a general and controlled nuclear disarmament.

The CGIL and the SZOT pledge to promote through appropriate contacts with the unions of West and East Europe, the holding in times of stress of a union conference on peace and disarmament in Europe.

The CGIL and the SZOT will contact each other periodically to check on the development of the reciprocal initiatives in this field.

8089

CSO: 3528/42

HUNGARY

HUNGARIAN TV AUDIENCE INTERESTED IN VIENNA PROGRAM

AU191413 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 19 Dec 83 p 2

[Special DIE PRESS report by "P.M."]

[Text] Vienna--The latest successes in expanding the Austrian Radio and Television Service [ORF] series of reports on East European affairs will probably produce a tangible result in the near future: as was learned last weekend from Vienna ORF headquarters, it is planned to rename the ORF "East Europe Bureau" the "Desk for East and Southeast Europe" [Redaktion fuer Ost- and Suedosteuropa]. This would kill two quite different birds with one stone: On the one hand, the geographically more precise definition should primarily satisfy nonaligned Yugoslavia, which to date has felt that it was grouped with the Warsaw Pact by the ORF program producers; on the other hand, the change in name reportedly reflects ORF's intention to further expand the range of this series.

Meanwhile, the "East Europe Bureau" producers have noted with satisfaction that, according to unofficial estimates, some 500,000 to 700,000 people in Hungary watched the "Club-2" discussion program on Hungary of this November that was aired by the Hungarian Television Service last week [on 13 December]. This rating, high even by Austrian standards, acquires added significance in light of the fact that the dubbed recording of the program, which lasted over 2 hours, was aired fairly late--at 2050 hours local time. Incidentally, there were two sections of the original program that were not contained in the Hungarian TV version: One dealt with Budapest's slightly strained relationship with Prague and Bucharest, the other mentioned persons or groups critical of the Hungarian regime.

CSO: 2300/223

HUNGARY

AUSTRIAN ARTICLE SCORES COOPERATIVE TV PROGRAM AS WHITEWASH

Vienna GEGENSTIMMEN in German No 14/4 Winter 83 pp 24-25

[Article by Imma Palme/Mihaly Torocsik: "Club 2--In Review"]

[Text] On Thursday, 17 October 1983 there was, once again, a "Club-2" broadcast on the subject of Hungary. What is different about it: it was produced in Budapest and is scheduled shortly to be broadcast on Hungarian TV.

The occasion for this enterprise: the visit to Budapest by Chancellor Sinowatz with a big entourage, including some business leaders.

Purpose: to strengthen friendly relations between the two countries.

The result: embarrassment.

The ORF [Austrian Broadcasting System] selected the subject: "Hungary Today." The four Hungarian discussion panel members, about whose selection the ORF obviously had no say, were historian Emil Niederhauser; the deputy managing editor of the party newspaper NEPSZABADSAG, Peter Renyi; the director of the Budapest studios of the Hungarian motion picture company Mafilm, Istvan Nemeskuerty; and a Budapest student named Agnes Szakadati.

And who were the ORF's choices as opposite numbers to that officially approved group, in the name of mandatory "balance?"

The editor of the PRESSE, Otto Schulmeister; university professor Norbert Leser; historian Brigitte Hamann, All of them honorable people, but not experts on the subject of Hungary. Absent from the Club-2 roundtable: people who would have been knowledgeable on current and acute problems in Hungary. Nobody who has any insight into economic reform issues and their cause, namely the continually worsening economic situation. Nobody who knows anything about the Hungarian dissidents or the independent peace groups. Nobody who would have had something to say about censorship problems. About the nationalist problem. And so on.

The whole thing was headed by a discussion leader, Paul Lendvai, who was even more pontifical than Renyi in making certain that not a single critical thought would see the light of day.

Viewers were put in the mood for the subject with two brief film clips which dealt with recent Hungarian history.

The first film--a scene from "The Witness"--immediately excited the round-table: its members talked, discussed, and finally decided that Hungary had "laughingly" broken with its past. Even the young Budapest woman declared that youth had a great interest in this subject.

Nothing was mentioned about the fact however that "The Witness" has not been shown in Hungarian movie houses for 10 years (!!!) because it was simply banned.

Nor was it mentioned that information about the 1950s, especially the events of 1956, is accessible to only a small privileged group. Newspapers of October-November 1956 are usually at the "bookbinder's"--and have been for 27 years. That is true of all libraries in the country.

No mention was made of the fact that while it is true that Hungarian films deal with interesting and exciting subjects and are well produced, such films are produced only if they are "esthetic," i.e., fictional. There are no documentary films about that era. Even World War II documentaries have their difficulties: one of these films was responsible for the firing of the director of the TV Institute, Richard Nagy. Or Judith Ember's attempt to make a film about the murder of a policeman in northeastern Hungary's Potapacsi in the 1940s. Ember demonstrated that the Communist Party used this murder as an excuse for nationalizing the church-supervised schools; that it served as a preparation for the Mindszenty trial (another forbidden subject in the Club!), and that it was part of the Hungarian Communist Party's "salami tactics." The film, made in the Bela Balazs Documentary Film Studio, is kept under lock and key and cannot be performed making for public performance.

Not one word was said about any of those things by the Austrians. They wouldn't have known about it anyway.

And Herr Lendvai--doesn't he know anything about it either? Is the director of the ORF Eastern bureau truly that uninformed? Or doesn't he want to, is unable to, or not permitted to talk about it, at least on Hungarian TV?

After the panel had beaten the subject of the high suicide rate to death without really getting to the bottom of it--a subject which was somewhat out of context of the discussion--it touched on the subject of the common past of the two countries. The two historians had their say.

Niederhauser is partial to the thought that the Hungarian democratic civil war of 1848 was a useless exercise since, squeezed in between two major powers, it was doomed to failure from the beginning. And that Kossuth--who until the end of his days remained true to his democratic values and died in exile in the Piedmontese city of Turin--was a useless radical in Hungarian history: after all, he demanded the establishment of a United Danube Republic.

As far as Niederhauser is concerned, the true history of civil and democratic Hungary starts with the historic Settlement of 1867.

But this kind of interpretation of Hungarian history by Niederhauser was just about all that was based on historic fact. In today's Hungary it is always possible to use historical allegories to talk about yesterday, when in fact one is talking about today.

What was all this leading up to? Professor Niederhauser (or maybe it was Nemeskuerty) made it quite clear, by trying to designate 1956 as the real start of Hungary's people's democracy, after the Consolidation. The words strongly resemble each other: one time it is called Consolidation, the next time Settlement. Both words were preceded by a revolution and, despite the fact that they were at the height of historic prominence, both suffered a military defeat. In neither case did the values on which the revolutions were based prevail, but led to miserable compromises.

Not one word from the Austrians about this tampering with history.

Not one word either to comment on Renyi's statement that the "showtrials were a Hungarian matter." Didn't any of those present want to, or were they not allowed to, pronounce the words "Soviet Union?" Nor did anyone contradict Renyi when he declared that Hungary had dealt with the Rakosi era in an exemplary manner, which could be recognized by the fact that Rakosi was expelled from the communist party.

That isn't true.

Rakosi was not expelled; the party was dissolved. A difference which is considerably more significant than it seems at first glance.

The roundtable which managed scrupulously to avoid mentioning 1956, finally managed to touch on something controversial: the dissidents came up in conversation. The subject was treated with kid gloves, thinking perhaps "we are after all sitting in a Hungarian TV studio; maybe the walls will cave in." Schulmeister inquired about the Catholic groups and finally even dared to ask "what objection there was against Konrad." Lendvai immediately and eagerly explained whom the talk was about and that his work was still being published in Hungary. The expert on Eastern Europe was corrected in this by none other than Peter Renyi. Only two books of Konrad's had been published, he said; the third one had not. Gyoergy Konrad, he continued, keeps repeating himself; he is one of those writers whose work is a flash in the pan.

Again, nobody took the trouble to state that it was Renyi himself who had roundly accused Konrad one year ago of being a CIA agent. Or the fact that it is Renyi who publishes those articles which indicate that police searches are taking place with ugly regularity during which underground publications are confiscated in heretofore unimaginable numbers. Raids which occasionally include violence such as in the case of underground publisher Gabor Demszky, who after one of the many police raids ended up in the hospital with a brain concussion.

When Renyi apparently became bored because he wasn't addressed, he himself mentioned one particular magazine. Lendvai, who constantly referred to it as "That paper," was apparently nonplussed. The publication which was without a doubt the most thrilling and exciting one which at the time of the Club-2 broadcast was still permitted in Hungary (significantly, it has since been banned), MOZGO VILAG. After calling it by name, Renyi added: "A thoroughly pessimistic paper."

Is it forbidden to be a pessimist in Hungary? Who, in fact, decides what constitutes pessimism? Renyi, or the readers, or the state? In any case, more than 700 students signed a petition requesting that the government-appointed managing editor (who has since obviously changed his tune), Ferenc Kulin, remain with the magazine. In fact, the university was closed down one whole day, because handbills and posters in favor of MOZGO VILAG were distributed there.

Not one word about this in the Club.

There was talk also about the poor people's support organization. It was referred to as "that group," and it was never called by its name. SZETA. The reason for the existence of such a group was made light of, too--there isn't that much poverty in Hungary, it was said. On the other hand, there was talk about the fact that academics are insufficiently paid, and everybody agreed that an improvement, i.e., raise in salary, was needed. Economic crisis? Economic reforms? Differences of opinion within the government concerning such reforms? No word about any of this.

Reviews in the local [Vienna] PRESSE about the Club-2 broadcast demonstrated the lack of insight by the PRESSE. It had the gall to state in its writeup of the Club-2 broadcast that "our neighbors will gain an insight into those aspects of life in their country which they normally would hardly get from their own media" (PRESSE, 19/20 November 1983). Nothing of the sort.

That much (or rather: that little) they can learn, though rarely, from their own television. Some vague mention of "those groups" or "the dissidents", in a style similar to Lendvai's, is occasionally made there--late at night, when the good citizens are asleep. And falsified history, so benevolently tolerated by the ORF, they are fed from infancy: 1848, the show trials, 1956...

For that they need neither the ORF nor its roundtable of East bloc experts. Kadar's state can afford to tolerate that kind of criticism. It's not for nothing that its system of government is one of the slickest in Eastern Europe.

To be sure, the ORF, itself a master in juggling "journalistic evenhandedness" was right in producing a program for the occasion which could serve to strengthen Austro-Hungarian (economic) relations. A program which could have described the (almost) untarnished image of "goulash communism" in glowing colors. But was it really necessary to choose a subject which couldn't fail to produce such awkward embarrassment? Couldn't it have been something less controversial, such as cultural exchanges?

P.S.: Rumors are emanating from the Kueniglberg that a Club-2 program is planned for Yugoslavia.

It's a good idea.

But if it is going to be a broadcast similar to the Hungarian Club, we had best forget about it.

9273

CSO: 2300/224

CULTURAL WEEKLY PRAISES COOPERATIVE TV PROGRAM

Budapest UJ TUKOR in Hungarian 25 Dec 83 p 28

[Article compiled by Domokos Csabai "Countering the Cold Winds"]

[Text] "Cold winds are blowing in the world"--thus characterized the present international situation Otto Schulmeister, editor of the Vienna DIE PRESSE in the cooperative Austrian-Hungarian TV program, the Hungarian version of which our audience could watch on our first TV channel on December 13. The fact alone that this joint program has been compiled is an eloquent proof of both governments' and both nations' interest in nursing good mutual relations and that facing the threatening winds of a new Cold War, they are striving to develop their friendly ties.

The discussion program was broadcast by the Austrian TV from Budapest in mid-November with Paul Lendvai as program director in one of the most popular TV shows of our neighbors called Club 2. The extensive debate, that went well into the late night hours, was of course primarily addressed to the Austrian audience. However the current Hungarian version, that excerpted its most relevant contents, was also interesting for us. It is an important and encouraging experiment designed to intensify our dialogue. Since the average Hungarian newspaper readers know a lot about all the problems discussed in the program, it would not be very useful to analyze now in detail what the participants had to say about the problematics of the suicides and the show trials, about the events of our common past or about the present economic difficulties. In our present review we rather try to present the hosts of the program by a picture and a quotation, so as to characterize the principal topics and the tone of this versatile discussion. We trust that this good beginning and the comprehensive review of the questions debated will be followed by the analysis of one or the other particularly relevant common problems.

Historian Brigitte Hamann about our Common History

The way a nation, a people, digests its own history is symptomatic of its degree of maturity. The current Austrian-Hungarian ties are still dependent on our ability to accomodate ourselves with the multiple adversities of our common history. That is why Austrian and Hungarian historians should meet and discuss the difficult problems which are arising on both sides.

Otto Schulmeister Editor of DIE PRESSE on Cultural Ties

Austrians who travel to Hungary have no idea about Kossuth and others, perhaps they know Bela Bartok, if they are interested in music.

But the reverse is true too. What do Hungarians know? Vienna, Johann Strauss, that Kreisky was chancellor for years, and then about the Habsburgs and that Otto Habsburg may be traveling around right now. But is this worthy of our old, rich, human and cultural common heritage?

Istvan Nemestothy, Director of Budapest Film Studio on Hungarian Films Dealing with Personality Cult.

We may say this is a way to combat the past. But this is only a superficial view. The issue is much more important. We feel that it is our duty to prevent the recurrence of such things with the help of these films.

Agnes Szakadati, College Student about Show Trials

It is very limited what our generation has read about those events, mainly in the text books. That period of time was rather shortly discussed, primarily by way of slogans and not much was explained about it.

Norbert Leser, University Professor, Political Scientist about Nationality Problem

Hungarians have not only relinquished their territorial demands but have also forgotten Burgenland completely, just as we forgot Sopron, the capital of Burgenland. This is no longer an apple of discord between the two countries. I may say that if all nations, living under different government systems, could be as friendly neighbors as Austrians and Hungarians are, then the nationality problem would no longer be virulent in the world.

Peter Renyi, Deputy Editor-in-chief of NEPSZABADSAG about Relation between Ideals and Reality

1956 brought us a great and basic discovery. Why did things develop otherwise since then? I think it is because we discovered that the road from reality to idealism is a long one which cannot be shortened artificially by volunteerism, use of force and pressure. If I may apply an abstract definition to the errors and sins that had been earlier committed, I would say that they derived from a wrong utopian mentality which imagined that human soul, man in short, can be changed by force.

Paul Lendvai, Studio Director of Austrian TV

I hope that we will have the opportunity to discuss our relations in as friendly an atmosphere as we have had in Budapest.

12312

CSO: 2500/169

VARIOUS ISSUES OF MONTHLY MYSL WOJSKOWA REVIEWED

July 1982 Issue

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 30 Jul 82 p 5

[Article by SZA: "Tactical Exercises: A Taste of Real Combat"; MYSL WOJSKOWA (Military Thought) is a Polish journal devoted to issues of military interest]

[Text] Tactical exercises with the troops are the most effective method for preparing commands, staffs and the troops for action under combat conditions. Exercises form a unique model of real battlefields and make it possible to show troops many features of combat and teach them how to execute tasks in the most effective manner under the given circumstances. The manner in which the exercises are conducted has an enormous influence on their course and outcome.

This problem is discussed by Col (academy graduate) H. Mikusek in his article "Directing Tactical Exercises as a Teaching Process" in the July issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA. The author states: "The direction of tactical exercises with troops is implemented with a permanent flow of information between the director of the exercises and the participating units on the goals of the exercise. A reliable flow of information in the form of feedback sets the conditions for the interaction of coordinated structures and is a good basis for efficient direction of exercises."

The following components can be distinguished in the direction of tactical exercises:

--gathering information on the degree to which certain information has been assimilated, the development of skills, setting the required predispositions of troops and commanders, the performance of assigned tasks, the conditions under which teams (subunits) are acting, the condition of forces and equipment of the enemy and of friendly troops and the position of fighting troops, etc.;

--processing the gathered information in order to optimize solutions that will help to achieve planned results in the area of the method of conducting exercises, the preparation of new tasks and commands, applying the exercise's

organizational and methodological measures, respectively, to the decisions made by the staffs and commands involved in the exercise and subsequent performance of various combat tasks;

--saving information that will be useful in the future;

--passing information between the leader of the exercises and the elements participating in them in unambiguous language (code) that is intelligible to both informational structures.

A further section of the article deals with the fundamental demands upon the leader of the tactical exercises made by the contemporary field of battle and the theory of directing groups of people. These demands have considerably grown and modify the leader's role in exercises. In this regard, it has properly come to be felt that the effectiveness of the direction of tactical exercises depends not only on the efficient activity of the leader but also on the attitudes and the degree of readiness of the groups taking part.

I would like to recommend the following items from the military section of this publication:

"Advance With Forced Crossing of Water Barriers" (Maj T. Murawski), "The Element of Surprise in Military Operations" (Capt W. Przybylak and Maj F. Pucilowski), "Some Activities To Prepare Rocket and Artillery Troops for Fire Missions" (Col A. Kowalski), "Improving the Ability to Make Surprise Attacks" (Col J. Zapior), and the editorial "Some Reflections on Simultaneous Attacks Against the Entire Area of Enemy Positions" (Col Z. Wontrucki).

The section "Organization and Computer Science" contains the two following articles: "Designating the Magnitude and Echelonment of an Independent Reserve in Spare Parts" (Maj W. Karp, Lt Col H. Parkitny and W. Szymczyk) and "Experimental Shop for Designing Computer Software" (Lt Col A. Stokalski, Lt Z. Suski and Lt Z. Zielinski).

In the "Economics" section, I would above all recommend the article by Col Z. Kolodziejak, "Restrictions and Economic War," in which the author clearly points out that the restrictions made against Poland are an essential element of the economic war that has been conducted for years between capitalism and socialism.

Unspecified Issue

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 1 Jul 82 p 5

[Article by SZA: "Surprise Attack and Preventing Surprise Attack"]

[Text] Since ancient times, the element of surprise has always played an important role in combat. It is one of the oldest, most important and everywhere recognized principles of the art of war.

In his article in MYSL WOJSKOWA, Col L. Kuleszynski attempts to answer two fundamental questions: what must be done to achieve surprise in an attack and how? What must be done to prevent oneself being taken by surprise? The title of the article is "The Element of Surprise in Offensive Operations, Achieving Surprise and Opposing a Tactical Formation."

The author, on the basis of analysis of experience from World War II and from the Near and Far East, regards the following factors as helpful in achieving surprise:

- a good knowledge of the enemy, his organization, weapons and methods of combat, fighting abilities and his position in the given combat situation;
- high level of professional ability in all troops, a good knowledge of the capabilities of available forces and weapons and a realistic assessment of one's own possibilities in the given situation;
- soldier training for qualities such as activeness, initiative, independence, courage, the ability to make bold and original decisions, energy and force and speed of action;
- a high level of combat readiness among units and subunits that will assure their rapid engagement at any given time or place;
- keeping secret one's own operation plans;
- deceiving and confusing the enemy, diversions, and disinformation;
- properly choosing directions and times of attack;
- making proper use of terrain, the times of day and weather;
- using military guile and strategy.

The author mentions the following factors among others as useful in counteracting surprise:

- a high level of discipline among the troops and their knowledge of the fundamental principles of surprise and the mechanisms of surprise, fear, and panic and psychological measures to counteract these effects;
- the ability to foresee events by not only the command cadre but the troops as well;
- effective reconnaissance activity;
- warning and alerting distant troops in time about expected enemy attacks and opportunities for surprise;
- strict observance of the principles of concealment at all levels of organization, confusing the enemy with all available forces and means and many other factors.

In the combined-arms section, some of the other articles are: "The Meaning of Reconnaissance in Combat Actions and Factors Contributing to Its Success" (Maj J. Finik), "In Defense of the Principle of Simultaneously Attacking the Enemy Over the Entire Area of His Combat Positions" (Col B. Lewczuk), "Selected Principles for Using Helicopters on the Modern Battlefield" (Lt Col R. Rajmanski and Maj W. Michalak), "Artillery Reconnaissance for Fire Requirements" (Lt Col S. Olszewski), and "Remarks on Systematizing War and Military Sciences" (Lt Col S. Koziej).

The section "Organization and Computer Science" contains the two articles: "Social Aspects of the Development of Computer Science" (Col Ciechanowicz) and "War Science and Systems Research" (Lt Col P. Sienkiewicz).

I would like to recommend to readers two unusual articles in the "Economics" section that deal with general national economic problems. One of them, by Col E. Sitek, is entitled "Directing the National Economy During Martial Law." In this article, the author discusses such problems as: order, discipline, management and work time; planning, directing the national economy, improving supplies, restoring the market balance and the first symptoms of the effects of economic activity. The second article, by Lt Col H. Sajecki, is entitled "The Economic Necessity of Martial Law." This article mainly deals with the problem of efficient use of materials, raw materials and power and the use of secondary raw materials in industrial production.

As usual, the issue concludes with the sections "Military History," "Our Fraternal Armies," reviews and discussions.

Reform, National Defense

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 15 Sep 82 p 4

[Article by SZA: "Reform and National Defense"]

[Text] The economic reform, as an effective means of overcoming the crisis by changing previous methods and structures of economic management, serves to maximize the effects of management. In its scope, it has covered all areas of social and economic life in our country, as well as defense.

In the last issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA, several articles were devoted to this very same urgent problem.

I would like to draw the readers' attention to some of them.

The first of this series of articles is by Dr S. Ciaston and is entitled "Economic Reform, Organizational Changes and Defenses." Discussing the directions that structural changes have taken, the author says that appropriate structural transformation should make it possible to reduce to necessary dimensions the state economic administration and intermediate levels of management and to apply the responsibilities and powers of the authorities to increasing the independence of economic units.

In this connection, the author points out the need to observe principles so that even radical changes of organizational structures will not disrupt the organizational stability of the socialist state. It must also be remembered that not all areas of the economy may be administered in a decentralized manner since there are such enterprises as transport, the power industry, communications and others that, for reasons of defense, require a centralized administration.

The next article, "Rationalization of Employment in Divisions of the Economy," was written by Col T. Kaminski and Capt T. Orpel. They discuss the possibilities for rationalizing employment under military conditions by such means as constantly improving work organization, streamlining work standards, teaching cadres and improving their qualifications. The authors take the position that, in terms of the army's specific conditions, the basic problems of rationalizing army employment may only be totally decided at a central level. This does not at all mean that an army unit must play a passive or auxiliary role in this regard. On the contrary, the individual unit has a primary role in streamlining work organizations.

I would like to point out to the readers still another article from the same subject area: This article, "Computer Systems in the Light of the Economic Reform" by Lt Col J. Iwaniak and Capt W. Skrzypczak, was published in the "Organization and Computer Science" section. From their deliberations, the authors conclude that the economic reform will have an important influence upon computer science both in terms of the demands that will be placed upon computer systems and the methods by which they will be developed. In connection with this, we must begin preparing specialists, methods and equipment to develop these systems.

The article "Systems, Man, Equipment and the Development of the Armed Forces" (Lt Col P. Sienkiewicz) concludes this section.

In the combined-arms section, the problems of using surprise as a tactical element are the dominant areas of discussion. This subject is handled in the following articles: "The Use of Surprise in the Combat Actions of Tactical Formations" (Lt Col Z. Galewski), "Surprise--An Element of Victory" (Z. Flieger), "The Enemy's Comprehensive Firing System in an Offensive Operation" (Col A. Kowalski) and "The Purpose and Meaning of Maneuver" (Maj L. Wdowski).

The issue is concluded as usual by the "Military History" and "Our Fraternal Armies" sections, reviews and discussions.

Operational Maneuver Groups

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 26 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by SZA: "Operational Maneuver Groups"]

[Text] The rapid development of action in the area of enemy positions, destruction of his ability to fight and paralyzing his ability to react to changes in situations have been the

fundamental conditions determining the final outcome of an attack since ancient times.

The idea of quick infiltration of the enemy rear areas by detached units found its reflection in combat practice during World War II. However, the question now being asked is whether these experiences are applicable to today's conditions in which troops are fully mechanized and motorized and both sides have weapons of mass destruction. If they can be applied, what sort of modification should be made in the concepts and principles for creating and using such elements of tactical and operational forces so that they meet the demands and requirements of modern warfare?

This topic is the subject of Lt Col S. Kolodziej's article "The Use and Action of Operational Maneuver Groups (OGM) in an Offensive Operation." He argues that the concept of operational maneuver groups was born of the need to find new solutions to the problems of how to preserve mobility in combat. There are various views about how these groups should be used, the nature of their tasks, and what role they will play in an offensive operation. There is nothing odd about that, all the more so as theory has been, in a certain sense, overtaken by practice. The first analyses and attempts made at solving this problem took place during exercises. The conclusions drawn served deeper reflection and the formulation of more general concepts.

In written materials about operational maneuver groups, one finds views that shed doubt on the suitability and possibility of using this element of operational forces. This view is based on conclusions drawn from comparative analysis of the actions of Soviet rapid groups during the last war and the predicted conditions of an eventual future battlefield. During World War II, the technical differences in the capabilities of maneuver groups were created, on one hand, from necessity and, on the other hand, from the possibility of using such groups to advance ahead of the main forces. At the present time, the mobility of all units is about the same and this makes the possibility of this kind of action seem doubtful.

"Of course, these doubts cannot be completely dispelled," states the author, "but it is worth pointing out that it is arguable whether historical experience justifies them." The author also points out that there is an improper tendency somehow to incorporate an operational maneuver group into the model for every operation without prior analysis of the need for using one. This is indulgence in a unique mode of operation.

Aside from the more broadly presented article above, the combined-arms section of the journal contained the following items: "Main and Supporting Strikes" (Col J. Szydlowski), "The Effectiveness of Artillery Fire" (Col A. Kowalski), and "Some Problems in the Research Activity at WSO [Higher Officers' School]" (Col W. Urbanski and Lt Col J. Rozkrut).

From the articles in the section "Organization and Computer Science," I would encourage the readers to become acquainted with the article by Dr Z. Cygan and Maj R. Tomcik entitled "Method for Assessing the Effectiveness of Irrational Operation of Computer Systems." From the "Economics" section, I

would recommend "Reflections on the Economics of Armed Struggle" by Col Z. Wontrucki and "Economic Reform, Plant Self-Management and National Defense" by Dr S. Ciaston.

In the section "Our Fraternal Armies," I would like to draw attention to the summary of Maj Gen A.P. Kurkov's article "Increasing the Depth of Simultaneous Actions Against the Enemy."

August 1982 Issue

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 1, Jan 83 p 48

[Article: "Climate as a Weapon"]

[Text] The possibilities of using climate as an active offensive weapon are being thoroughly studied in many research centers in the West, and especially in the United States. Some practical attempts have already been made to use weather for military purposes. For example, in Vietnam, the United States tried to increase precipitation during monsoons to cause flooding that would cover the supply roads to the North Vietnamese troops. This operation was, however, a fiasco. Other such attempts were made by Israel to increase the intensity of precipitation in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in order to lessen rainfall there. These and other examples of change in climatic conditions, wind circulation and humidity that can be induced over a given area for military purposes are discussed by Dr Maciej Sadowski in his article "The Importance of Knowledge of Climate for Modern Armed Forces."

The author writes: "The role of climate in military activities consists of:

--the influence of weather on a military operation being conducted and the ability to use specific features in combat;

--using climate as an active means of combat;

--using the most recent knowledge of climate to destroy the enemy politically and thus accomplish military goals without having to conduct warfare."

M. Sadowski also stresses the importance of climatological information to proper planning of defensive activities. Having, for example, enough information on wind circulation in a given region would make it possible to assess the chances of eliminating the effects of poisonous gases or nuclear weapons fallout. Knowing the frequency and depth of snowfall makes it possible to use snow cover as protection against radiation. A layer of snow acts as a shield against radiation just as effectively as concrete and must be only five times thicker. Lowering the radiation level 16 times requires a 40-cm layer of concrete or a 200-cm layer of snow.

A knowledge of the level of precipitation is also quite important. More than 10 mm of precipitation over a 24-hour period prevents the spread of fires caused by incendiary weaponry.

Surface and water transport can be more effectively planned when the climatic conditions are known, since icing of roads, fog, summer downpours and low water level in rivers then will not present any unforeseen problems.

Modern research being conducted into the causes and mechanisms of climatic changes should make it possible to forecast global and regional weather conditions. Weather forecasting can become an instrument of political and economic struggle that does not require armed warfare. The armed forces of the capitalist countries are sparing no costs on studies of this sort.

Dr Maciej Sadowski's article was published in MYSL WOJSKOWA No 8/82.

December 1982 Issue

Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH I WOJSK OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ KRAJU in Polish No 4, Apr 83 p 84

[Article: "What Others Are Writing"]

[Text] The article "Methodologies of Military Prognosis" by Col Andrzej Madejski explains the general principles and methods used in Polish military prognosis. In the author's opinion, the given work procedure in making up a prognosis is best applied to the actual capabilities of our cadre and to the equipment of commands, staffs and institutions.

"The Present State and Prospects for Development of the Modern Theory of Command" is the title of an article by Lt Col Piotr Sienkiewicz which assesses particular elements (sections) of the theory of command and presents prospects for its further development in the 1980's and 1990's.

March 1983 Issue

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 31 Mar 83 p 7

[Article by SZA: "The Development of Defense"]

[Text] In the March issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA, I would like to familiarize the readers with the content of an article by Capt A. Muszynski entitled "An Outline of the Methodology for Planning the Development of Defense." This article was published under the journal's economics section.

The author discusses some of the theoretical controversies on differences in the division of the social and economic system into parts or subsystems and the description of material, financial and material-financial phenomena by computer systems and then presents an outline of a methodology for planning the development of national defenses. Following this, he then deals with the basic methods of analytical and decision-based selection of a complex and individual type of development.

The method of coordinating activities among the allies of the socialist community consists of working out a division of defense and defense-economic

enterprises among the states of the Warsaw Pact according to the goals (coordinated with peaceful social and economic development) of the individual states, the entire coalition and the economic and defensive capabilities of its members.

The method of operational appraisal consists of analysis, description and appraisal of the basic functional subsystems of the defense system, for example, combat subsystems or weapons systems.

The method of using production figures should define and set parameters to the economic flexibility of a state's defense capabilities, mainly its economic and defensive potential in the case of economic mobilization or war. An important role in this method is played by assessment of the resource materials-intensiveness of the method of action.

The differential or standards method for choosing a plan is the nucleus of the analysis and decisionmaking process for planning the development of defenses. This method consists in choosing the most favorable variant of a plan for allocating budget resources for the political and strategic goals of defense development. This method belongs to the class of comparative methods.

The effectiveness method is based on the idea that the level of political opposition may be inversely proportional to the technical and economic effectiveness of subsystems of military technology. Similarly, the nominal or actual effects of the system in different situations may be inversely proportional (as is quite often the case) or not proportional at all to the system's costs.

Aside from the article above, the "Economic" section of the journal contained two other items: "Transport-Intensiveness as an Element in the Assessment of Transport Management in the Army" (Col T. Kaminski) and "National Income--Dynamics and Structure: Part II" (Col F. Trojan).

The following articles were in the general tactical section: "A Tactical Formation's Transition from Attack to Defense in a Limited Amount of Time" (Lt Col A. Jaworski and W. Kaliszczyk), "Conditions Under Which a Tactical Formation Goes Into Pursuit" (Z. Skrzypczak), "Modeling a System of Action for Gaining Surprise in Combat" (Lt Col S. Ptak), "Advancing Artillery to Its Firing Positions While Organizing Breakthrough of Enemy Positions From Areas Within the Area of Dispositions" (Col J. Szyszkowski), "Directing Anti-aircraft Fire" (Brig Gen W. Nidek and Maj B. Ciesielski), "Increasing Effectiveness in the Use of Communications Equipment" (Col K. Patkowski), and "Tendencies in the Development of Antitank Land Mines" (Lt Col J. Garstka).

The section "Organization and Computer Science" contained the articles "Observations on the Infallibility of Computer Systems" (Maj J. Haschka) and "Reflections of an Army Commissar" (Lt Col J. Telep). The subject of the last article is very relevant and should interest many readers.

April 1983 Issue

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 29 Apr 83 p 6

[Article by SZA: "The System of Military Education"]

[Text] People are educated according to planned goals for shaping their character, emotions, imagination, thinking, will and outlook. Teaching difficulties may occur due to the fact that human nature is still not completely understood and that behavior can be neither totally programmed nor predicted in particular situations.

This complex problem is the subject of one of the articles in the April issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA (4/1983), "Military Education in the Light of Systems Theory," by Lt Col K. Zegnalek.

The following items were published in the section "Combined Arms": "Permanence --The Fundamental Attribute of a Modern Defense" (Col Z. Galewski), "Using Artillery Fire to Surprise the Enemy" (Col R. Urlinski), "Battle Simulations" (Maj M. Mankowski), "Principles of Radioelectronic Warfare" (Col H. Piekarski), and "Direct Contact with the Enemy" (Col Z. Wontrucki).

Aside from the article previously mentioned, the section "Organization and Computer Science" contains the following articles: "Engineering Systems of Action in the Army" (Col J. Konieczny), "Possibilities for Using Computers to Portray an Operational or Tactical Situation" (Lt Col J. Pieta), and "Models for a Field Repair System" (Maj Z. Poniatowski and Col J. Telep).

In the "Economics" section, all of the articles go beyond the range of problems professionally dealt with in military economics. Of special interest is Col W. Stankiewicz's article "A Rational Return to Peacetime Defense Management."

June 1983 Issue

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 29 Jun 83 p 7

[Article by SZA: "Problems of Counterattack and...Sustenance"]

[Text] From the wealth of articles included in the June issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA, I would like to call special attention to Maj B. Szulc's article "Certain Problems That Units and Tactical Formations Have in Performing Counterattacks."

The author correctly feels that the performance of counterattacks is only one element of the defenders' activities. Moreover, this activity should take the form of constant and effective maneuvering of fire and forces, flexible and positive command of subunits (units) during the defensive battle, efficient and systematic restoration of the disrupted system of defenses (mainly the fire control and command system), quick and decisive closing of the holes in friendly positions that have been formed by enemy attacks or nuclear strikes and maintaining and restoring coordination and disrupted support elements.

After discussing the goals and methods of counterattacks on a tactical level, the author points out certain conditions that have an effect on the ability to counterattack.

In a situation in which an enemy breakthrough into the defensive zone of a tactical formation has occurred in only one direction (in the area of one of the first echelon units while the defenses of other units remain intact), the second echelon will be ready to counterattack, defeat the enemy where he has advanced and restore the former positions.

The enemy breakthrough may not be too deep (no deeper than to the second line of a first-echelon battalion, or if it is a tactical formation, as far as the unit's second line). If these boundaries are broken, the counterattack will turn into a meeting engagement.

The width of an enemy breakthrough should not upset the friendly forces' ability to counterattack and organize a defense. If this occurs, part of the enemy's forces will be able to attack the flanks and rear of the counterattacking force while it is counterattacking and organizing other defenses. This is especially important when an armored counterattack is being performed.

During a counterattack, the enemy should not be able to bring reinforcements into the battle. For this reason, it is very important to assess the enemy's ability to bring up reserves before any decision is made to counterattack. If the enemy does bring up in time a second echelon that is equal in strength to the counterattacking force, this can enable him to break up the counterattack and rapidly advance into friendly defenses.

The position of neighboring units can allow enemy troops to infiltrate the flanks and rear areas of the defending tactical formation (unit). In a situation in which the enemy does break through the defenses of one of the neighboring tactical formations, this gives him an opportunity to bring up fresh forces and threaten the flanks and rear of the defending formation.

In sum, it can be said that a counterattack will achieve success if the following conditions can be determined in detail: the direction of the enemy attack, the depth of the attack, the boundaries and breadth of the attack, the position of enemy reserves and the position (situation) of neighboring friendly units.

In the "Economics" section, an interesting article worthy of attention is Col Z. Kolodziejak's "Problems of Troop Maintenance During Periods of Tension and Danger of War."

Other than the above, there are many other interesting articles in this issue.

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